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Abstract
Since the early 1960s, African states have been engaged in the process of uniting their 
economies and politics to improve the welfare of their people. A decade earlier, the West 
European countries also embarked on similar mission. The latter's economic integration project 
succeeded not only in bringing together the economies of the six founding members, but it also 
expanded to include 22 additional countries both from the western part of Europe and the 
formerly communist Eastern Europe. Moreover, the European integration process managed to 
jump from customs union to a single market and then to monetary union within a span of forty 
years. Now the European Union is looking for deeper and wider integration that resembles 
political union. On the other hand, the African integration endeavor has barely achieved any 
progress. After almost 55 years of efforts to unite the African economy, the continent has 
witnessed the proliferation of regional economic communities (RECs) rather than establish its 
African Economic Community. Currently, Africa is home to 14 different RECs. Though these 
RECs are at different levels of integration, their success rate in terms jumping from one 
integration level to the next is dismal. This paper attempts to answer why Africa’s economic 
integration project has not succeeded in achieving its goal after half a century’s journey.
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2Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1.Problem Statement
After the inception of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, one of the 
main objectives of the continental body, among other things, was to bring the continent closer 
in terms of its political, economic and social cooperation to “achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa.”1 The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 
1980-2000 was one of the content rich documents that called for regional economic 
integration of Africa. “We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our 
governments and peoples,” it declares, “to promote the economic integration of the African 
region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse.”2 The ultimate 
goal of the Lagos Plan of Action was to “…pave the way for the eventual establishment of an 
African Common Market leading to an African Economic Community [AEC].”3 Furthermore, 
the OAU declared a legal framework for the integration process of the continent in 1991, 
called the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community or simply the Abuja Treaty 
of 1994 (entered in to force in 1994). According to this treaty, AEC is to be established in 34 
years, to be exact in the year 2028, in six stages.4
When the African Union (AU) replaced OAU in 2002, it picked-up where the latter 
left-off and stressed the “…need to accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty 
establishing the AEC in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to 
face more effectively the challenges posed by globalization.”5 The AU, which modeled itself 
after the European Union, considers regional integration as one of the determinant objectives 
to deal with socio-political and economic challenges Africa is facing today; hence it vowed to 
                                                     
1 Organization of African Unity, OAU Charter (Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963), 3.
2 Organization of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa1980-2000
(Lagos: OAU, 1980), 4.
3 Ibid.
4 Organization of African Unity, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja: OAU, 1991),
10.
5 African Union, The Constitutive Act of the African Union (Lome: AU, 2000), 3.
3“accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent.”6 Twenty long 
years have passed since Abuja, and the process of integration is nowhere near meeting its 
scheduled framework. The AU’s assessment about the status of integration confirms the 
inglorious truth that the different regional economic communities (RECs), the stepping-
stones to AEC, are at different stages of their respective region’s integration process. Whereas 
EAC has reached the Customs Union, others, such as IGAD, AMU and CENSAD are at the 
pre-free trade stage.7
1.2.Thesis Statement
OAU/AU’s over half a century's efforts to integrate Africa politically and economically 
have been ineffective and the continent is as disintegrated, politically and economically, as it 
was during the independence decade of the 1960s. The ultimate desired outcome of the 
integration, the betterment of the lives of Africans, remains elusive. Intra-African trade is the 
least developed compared with other parts of the world; conflicts continue to consume 
African lives and resources; Africa is the only region in the world where poverty has 
continued to rise since 1980; and the continent quite frequently finds it difficult to forge a 
united position to deal with regional and global issues. Even though the OAU/AU has taken 
many initiatives to facilitate the integration of the continent, Africa’s socio-economic and 
political realities have hardly changed. Too many mechanisms, declarations, plans and 
roadmaps have been created, but too little implementation means they remain ineffective on 
the ground. 
The naked truth is that Africa is not yet ready for meaningful integration due to four 
fundamental factors that lie at the heart of the 50 years' unsuccessful integration process the 
OAU/AU has failed to address. First, many of the African countries have not completed their 
nation-building process fully, both politically and economically. The grim reality is, much has 
                                                     
6 African Union, The Constitutive Act of the African Union, 5. 
7African Union Commission, Status of Integration in Africa (SIA IV), 2013, 20.
(https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/29939-doc-sia_2013latest_en.pdf) (accessed May 24, 2014)
4not been changed even in this century. Therefore, the integration process was and still is not 
among strong and stable countries. Second, the 54 member states of AU do not share the 
same political values and principles. As we shall discuss later in detail, political asymmetry is 
detrimental to regional cooperation and integration. Third, very weak and small intraregional 
trade and economic interdependence have been additional hindrances for regional integration. 
These three factors are closely related, but have features unique to each of them.
Finally, the AU is modeling itself after the EU. However, imitating the organizational 
structure of other regional integrations will not facilitate the integration process, as it has its 
own limitations. Therefore, even if AEC is hastily established in the remaining 14 years, 
without fully addressing these core issues, it will be very difficult to keep the Community 
running as one oiled machine. 
1.3.Research Questions
The above statement of the problem shows us that Africa is still finding it difficult to 
integrate, despite its long struggle. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether Africa is ready for 
regional integration. To answer this question, we have to pursue the following research 
questions:
1. Has Africa completed its nation-building process? In their current condition, can 
African countries be considered mature countries, both economically and politically?
2. Can Africa, with its current political asymmetry, be able to facilitate and realize its 
integration? Is it viable that democracies and autocracies can establish a genuine and 
lasting integration? 
1.4.Statement of Significance 
Africa’s post-independence attempts at regional integration have been a subject of 
study for many decades. Most existing literature assesses the prospect of integration 
negatively either in terms of little progress or outright failure. At the same time a myriad of 
studies were done about the socio-economic and political confusion of African countries 
5following the independence years. However, there is a broad tendency among scholars and 
policy-makers in general to look into the unsuccessful regional integration and the challenges 
of national integration separately. In other words, there is a gap in the attempts to create links 
between the deficiencies in the fundamentals of the states (domestic politics and nation-
building projects) and their challenges, first to national integration and then to regional 
integration. Instead of digging deep and trying to find whether African countries have 
favorable national conditions to embark on their regional integration, scholars have tended to 
examine the secondary causes, which are the by-products of these fundamentals, as 
hindrances to regional integration. In addition to the state-level weaknesses, the OAU/AU’s 
failure to create any mechanism to support the establishment of functional states has further 
dragged the integration process. This skewed view continues to influence policy-making at 
both national and regional levels and hence has facilitated failure in both national and 
regional integration. 
This paper will try to fill the abovementioned gap and make a connection between 
the fundamentals of African countries and regional economic integration schemes, and will 
argue that without building economically and politically strong and viable states, regional 
integration in Africa will be as elusive and as difficult as it has been for the last half century. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes the decisive role the AU can play in speeding-up the integration 
process by promoting such states. 
1.5.Scope of the Study
The paper focuses on the significant role democracy can play to facilitate African 
regional integration by assisting the flourishing of united and functional states. Its central 
argument is that, it is only after African countries have adhered to democratic values and 
principles (when they attain political symmetry) that the continent can start to take giant steps 
towards realizing its elusive dream of regional integration. The fact that it is the least studied 
subject with regard to African regional integration has shaped my strong conviction that 
6shared democratic values and principles can help African countries shake off their shackles 
and spur them to better political, economic and social conditions domestically and then 
regionally.
However, there are some limitations that affect the research process. It does not go 
deep in to the whole integration process; it rather narrows its focus on the fundamental 
impediments to the process. Its findings are based on deductions from existing theories of 
international cooperation, democratic peace theory in particular, and historical events and 
experiences of regional integration. Therefore, given the fact that qualitative data are subject 
to interpretation, it is not unexpected that others can interpret the information used in this 
thesis differently. Lack of resources to conduct surveys and interviews limited me to focus 
more on the internet-based sources, including journal articles, reports, publications, speeches 
and news.
1.6.Methodology
This thesis is largely based on qualitative data. By using primary data (latest reports 
and publications) from different organizations, such as AU, Freedom House, African 
Economic Commission, EU, MERCOSUR and ASEAN, and some secondary data, it will 
analyze and interpret the maturity of African countries or if they are “complete/competent
states” at this point in time. The analysis and interpretation will indeed show that African 
countries still have a long way to go to establish politically and economically viable states. 
Hence, until then, the continent will face continued impediment to regional integration. Then 
I will apply the Democratic Peace Theory, extrapolated to national level, in arguing how to 
build strong states. To support the validity of the theory and for the purpose of comparison, 
the democratic experience of other regional groups around the world, including Africa, will 
be used.
71.7.Theoretical Framework
The theoretical basis of this paper is the democratic peace theory, first proposed by 
Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace. In explaining how peace can permanently 
be established in international relations, Kant argues that the civil constitution of each state 
shall be republican, for it has the “prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual 
peace.”8 In Kant’s argument, perpetual peace is when permanent peace is established in the 
international system or between neighbouring states. Based on this argument, the republican 
constitution leads to a political system where the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of 
the government are separate from each other. Furthermore, according to Kant, respect to the 
right of private property and contract is one of the main pillars of the republican constitution; 
but above all it is a constitution that gives the power to the people to choose their leaders, 
which means the power of governance effectively rests in the hands of the citizens rather than 
the proprietary and hereditary rulers who tend to go to war at will without the consent of the 
citizens. Therefore, if states are governed by the republican constitution, the citizens will 
always have a say in the affairs of their country, which makes it difficult to enter into war 
with other states as it is the citizens who are to pay the price for the war both in terms of their 
lives and property. In the words of Kant, going to war means, the citizens “...must fight 
themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do 
their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a 
crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and 
which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending.”9
Hence, if the international system is consisted of republican form of governments, the 
likelihood of war between states is low while the possibility of permanent peace and 
cooperation is high. 
                                                     
8 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. Campbell Smith, (London: George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1903), 122. 
9 Ibid, 123.
8Dean V. Babst in his piece, Elective Governments – A Force For Peace (1964), using 
historical empirical study, reaffirmed the theory that states with republican form of 
government never go to war against each other. Babst elaborates that such kinds of 
governments have the legislature, parliament, and executive branches elected by majority 
vote at regular intervals by the electorate from two or more opposing voices. He further 
argues that, these types of governments should exist in independent countries with clearly 
defined borders. Babst adds that secret ballot and freedom of speech and press are key 
features of such governments. Having these characteristics of elective governments as a 
backdrop, Babst reveals that from 1789 to 1941, 116 wars were fought in which 438 
countries took part. Interestingly, he found that, in this span of 152 years none of the 
independent nations with elective government fought wars against each other. For this reason, 
his conclusion: “The existence of independent nations with elective governments greatly 
increases the chance for the maintenance of peace”10 was not different in its spirit from the 
perpetual peace of Immanuel Kant. Following in the footsteps of the Kantians, Jack S. Levy 
further emphasizes that domestic political factors play important role in the process leading to 
war. Levy is well-known for his conclusion which affirms democracies never fight with each 
other. He wrote that “This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything 
we have to an empirical law in international relations.”11
For anyone who reads this conclusion, it is natural to ask such questions as “why 
democracies never fight with each other? What makes peace to last among these types of 
governments? For many scholars, the explanation as to why peace prevails and sustains 
between democracies, commonly referred to as Democratic Peace, boils down to two factors: 
Normative and structural causes of peace.
                                                     
10 Dean V. Babst, “Elective Governments – A Force For Peace” (1964), The Wisconsin Sociologist, vol. 3, no. 1 
(1964):14.
11Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1988): 662.
9The normative cause of peace argues that the values, norms, behaviours, beliefs and 
cultures of democracies play an important role in preventing war between such states. The 
reasons are that in democracies there is a norm or belief shared by the people that political 
conflict and disagreements should be resolved through peaceful means, such as negotiations 
and compromises. Therefore, whenever disputes or disagreements arise between 
democracies, both sets of the population who possess the same norms, behaviours and beliefs 
have a common understanding about how to settle the dispute and reach a compromise. 
However, these norms and beliefs are developed from the domestic political structure that 
empowers, represents and listens to the people through its different features: free and 
objective mass media, vibrant civil society, independent branches of the government, fair and 
free elections, legal due process and a political system that allows and guarantees popular 
participation. Therefore, this separation of powers of the government and other institutions 
and mechanisms constrains the leaders to go to war easily. Hence, the structural cause of 
peace. However, sometimes leaders can go to war without popular support or against the will 
of the people. Though it is rare in democracies to disregard popular will and go to war 
unilaterally (or if they fail to deliver on their commitments), the people have the power to 
change unpopular leaders periodically through peaceful means, which is their votes, and what 
James D. Fearon termed as “leaders suffer audience cost.”12Thus, for fear of losing their 
public offices in transparently contested elections, politicians try to do their best not to upset 
the body of voters (electorate) by resorting to unpopular political moves or by losing 
credibility to their commitments. 
These structural controlling mechanisms (constitutional check and balance, free press, 
civil societies, free and fair election) and norms and beliefs of the people in democracies 
makes war among their countries more difficult. When war becomes difficult, cooperation 
                                                     
12James D.Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute," American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994): 577.
10
can be achieved. Though it can be contested, if perpetual peace prevails between two 
neighbouring countries, it can easily lead them towards cooperation in the areas of trade and 
commerce. As cooperation has a contagious nature, the more democracies exist in one block, 
the larger the cooperation expands. When democratic countries work together more and 
more, where negotiations and concessions take centre stage, it easily gives them confidence 
to establish a supranational body to coordinate and organize their cooperation, to which they 
can willingly surrender some of their sovereign rights.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Regional economic integration has been a subject of study for many scholars in the 
post-World War II period and more so with the European economic integration process 
starting from the early 1950s. Many existing essays show that there is lack of consensus on a 
comprehensive and single definition of the term. However, there is yet a general departure 
point for understanding the term. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines 
“integration” as “the act or process of combining two or more things so that they work 
together.”13 From this we can infer that, when scholars talk about “regional economic 
integration,” they mean the bringing of separate national economies of a region together. The 
ultimate objectives of economic integration (securing access to a wider market and 
reinforcing growth in order to attain a higher level of national welfare14) are similar in all 
regional economic integration arrangements. So is the understanding and meaning of the term 
“economic integration” itself, though different scholars use different words. 
Bela Balassa (1961), while conceding that there is no clear-cut meaning for the term 
economic integration, defines it both as a process and as a state of affairs. Balassa argues that 
economic integration has to go through a process, which “encompasses measures designed to 
abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states,” before 
it becomes a state of affairs, which “can be represented by the absence of various forms of 
discrimination between national economies.”15
For John Pinder (1968) economic integration is “a process towards union”16 that 
includes both the elimination of discriminatory economic barriers between member countries 
of a whole and the harmonization of common policies to ensure the economic wellbeing of 
                                                     
13Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “integration.”
14John Pinder, Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC, 
The World Today24, no.3 (1968), 88-110.
15Bela Balassa, Theory of Economic Integration: An Introduction, (Greenwood Press, 1961), 173-185.
16John Pinder, 88.
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participating members are meaningfully attained. 17 Jovanović (2014) in his book, 
International economic integration: Limits and prospects, refers to Kahnert et al. (1969) as 
describing economic integration as a process of the progressive removal of discrimination 
that exists along national borders; Pelkmans (1984) understands integration as elimination of 
economic frontiers between two or more economies; El-Agraa (1985) as the discriminatory 
removal of all trade impediments between participating nations and the establishment of 
certain elements of coordination between them. Swann (1996) defines it as a state of affairs 
or a process that involves the combination of previously separate economies into larger 
arrangements.18
The Western European economic integration process and its initial success inspired 
other regions to undertake similar projects. The Organization of African Unity (hereafter 
OAU) in 1963 and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereafter ASEAN) in 1967 are 
some of the regional organizations that were established to bring about both economic and 
political regional integration in their respective regions. The African regional economic 
integration, which is the focus of this thesis, in particular is a subject of much attention. The 
existing literature, though it accepts the unquestionable importance of regional economic 
integration in Africa, overwhelmingly agrees that the attempts at regional integration are not 
as successful as those in Europe. Regional integration can earn the highly disintegrated, weak 
and small economies of African countries the benefit of economies of scale and scope 
(Ancharaz et. al., 2011; ECA, 2004), increase their competition positions in global market 
and attract more investment in the form of FDI (Kritzinger, 2005; Ancharaz et. al., 2011; 
ECA, 2004), improve regional security, enhance government reforms and increase their 
bargaining power in international negotiations (Kritzinger, 2005; ECA, 2004) and reduce 
their trade dependence on their former colonial masters (Ancharaz et. al., 2011).
                                                     
17Ibid., 90.
18Miroslav N. Jovanović, International economic integration: Limits and prospects, (Abingdon, Oxon: Rouledge, 
2014), 5-10.
13
However, despite all the advantages of regional integration, as described below, 
many scholars and international institutions, including AU itself, agree that regional 
integration in Africa is not a proud story. The views range from those of complete failure to 
little success or slow progress. Olufemi Babarinde (2007)19 argues that except on few issues, 
the OAU was a big failure. To support his argument, he refers to the failure of the OAU to 
avert the various civil wars that have bled the continent since its independence. He blames 
these defeats on the very Charter of the OAU, which states “non-interference” as one of its 
principles. Alan Matthews (2003) agrees and maintains “virtually all regional integration 
efforts in [Sub-Saharan Africa] to date have failed.”20 In similar vein, Percy S. Mistry (2000) 
opines that integration efforts in Africa appear “to have been visceral rather than rational, 
more rhetorical than real.”21 On the other hand, more optimistic views argue that even 
though the regional integration process of Africa has not fully yielded the desired goals and 
objectives, they believe that the integration is progressing slowly, with minimal achievements 
(Adedeji, 2002; AU, 2013).
These divergent views, nevertheless clearly elucidate one tangible fact: there are 
factors impeding the whole regional integration process in Africa. Considerable studies of 
this subject once again show that there is huge controversy on which factors are primarily 
responsible for the failure or frustratingly slow pace of integration in Africa. The small size of 
intraregional trade is one factor that gets considerable coverage in the literature as one of the 
impediments for regional economic integration in Africa. The overwhelming consensus is 
that, a greater degree of intraregional trade and economic interdependence facilitates regional 
economic integration arrangements. For example, Martin J. Dedman (1996), in his piece 
about the history of European integration, explains that the six original members of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (France, Germany, Italy and Benelux) initiated and 
                                                     
19 Olufemi Babarinde,“The EU as a Model for the African Union: the Limits of Imitation,”Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Paper Series 7, no. 2 (2007).
20 Alan Matthews, Regional Integration and Food Security in Developing Countries, (Rome: FAO, 2003): 73.
21 Percy S. Mistry, Africa’s Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration, African Affairs 99, (2000): 554.
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facilitated the process of European integration by increasing their intraregional trade through 
the establishment of a common market. 22 The linear model of economic integration 
(preferential trade agreement, free trade area, customs union, common market and complete 
economic integration) is all about reaching for total economic integration by increasing trade 
relations between states through the progressive removal of barriers to trade in several phases 
(Belassa, 1961; UNECA 2004; WTO, 2011). Even though it is not a rule to follow the model 
sequentially and countries can initiate their integration from any stage, the most ideal formula 
and one that lays the ground for deeper and wider integration, is to start trade relations free of 
barriers. Such trade impediments are recognized as hindering intra-African trade and hence 
the progress of regional integration of the continent (Ancharaz et. al., 2011).
Intra-regional trade in Africa is the lowest compared to other regions of the world 
(Ancharaz et. al., 2011; WTO, 2011; Kimenyi et. al., 2012; UNCTAD, 2013), meaning that 
Africa lacks economic interdependence to facilitate regional integration. Even though Africa 
has many reasons to integrate, such as small markets, many land-locked countries and 
distance from the main big markets like Europe, US or Asia (Ancharaz et. al., 2011; Kimenyi 
et. al., 2012), many scholars raise some fundamental factors as thwarting the flourishing of 
intra-regional trade. These factors include, but are not limited to lack of infrastructure (Mistry, 
2000; Ancharaz et. al., 2011), transport (Ancharaz et. al., 2011), economic diversification 
(Kimenyi et. al., 2012, UNCTAD, 2013), poor implementation of regional integration 
agreements (Adedeji, 2002; UNECA, 2004), overlapping membership in regional economic 
communities (UNECA, 2004; Adedeji, 2002; Rasul Shams, 2005; Leshaba, 2002), non-
observance of the rule of law and good governance (Adedeji, 2002), poor private sector and 
civil society participation (Alan Matthews, 2003; Adedeji, 2002; Leshaba, 2002), political 
instability and conflicts (Mistry, 2000; Leshaba, 2002) and unwillingness to yield sovereignty 
                                                     
22 Dedman J. Martin, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95: a history of European 
integration, (London and New York: Routlege, 1996): 57-62.
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to a supranational body (Alan Matthews, 2003; Mistry, 2000; Mzukisi Qobo, 2007).
This argument seems plausible. There is no doubt that all these factors contribute 
negatively to the progress of regional integration. Underdeveloped infrastructures are 
hindering fast and efficient movement of people, goods and services in the continent. Small 
intra-regional trade makes neighboring countries mutually less significant to each other and 
discourages them to plan for the future together. An undiversified economy compels African 
countries to look for more developed trading partners, other than their neighbors, who can 
satisfy the needs of their domestic markets. Political instability and conflicts have been some 
of the major elements standing between Africa and its vision. However, all these factors are 
only immediate factors putting a brake to the integration process. These factors themselves 
are the result of something else. They are symptoms of profound deficiencies in the political 
and economic structures of the states themselves. Therefore, treating them as the underlying 
or root causes deterring integration is simplistic, misplaced and an effect-based analysis. To
understand the failure or slow progress of regional integration in Africa deeply, therefore, it is 
imperative that a thorough analysis of the fundamentals of states trying to integrate be 
undertaken. Mzukisi Qobo (2007) explains that “Africa’s regional integration project as well 
as its slow and tortuous integration into the global economy is an integration of incomplete 
states.”23 Qobo’s understanding is that African countries have not yet achieved integration 
internally -- states which cannot be considered as having attained “complete nationhood and 
suffer from internal insecurities.”24 Therefore, the foundations of the post-colonial period's 
unsuccessful regional integration attempts in Africa were weak states. Qobo's claim helps to 
bring on board Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov (2012). In their piece, Holding-
Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration, which examines the regional 
integration attempts of the Former Soviet Union States (FSU)*, Libman and Vinokurov (ibid.) 
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explain why regional integration failed in these states. They argue that, the failure of regional 
economic integration in the FSU was attributed to three fundamental reasons. Firstly, 
“economic cooperation between the FSU countries was inherently inefficient: the cost of 
surviving trade links was too high to maintain; therefore this naturally led to 
noncooperation.”25 Secondly, their domestic factors, such as the nature of political regimes 
and nation-building projects, made cooperation difficult between the FSU countries. This 
argument can be explained by the fact that the region was dominated by autocracies which 
make implementation of regional integration agreements difficult as these types of regimes 
do not provide credibility of commitments to their international partners. Thirdly, the FSU 
countries were asymmetrical politically and economically.26
Libman and Vinokurov's (2012) analysis, the domestic factors (nature of political 
regimes and nation-building projects in particular) as impediments to regional economic 
integration, can be extrapolated to understand the fundamental causes of the unsuccessful 
regional integration project in Africa. As a matter of fact there is no lack of analysis on the 
deeper, underlying problems or the fundamentals of African countries or as Qobo (2007) 
notes about the incomplete states. Considerable amount of literature focusing on why African 
countries are trapped in the vicious circle of poverty, political instability and conflict, and 
lack of economic growth and development, places the cause of these challenges in the weak 
domestic political nature of the countries themselves. However, it is evident that there is little 
or no attempt to link the unsuccessful regional integration with the underlying problems of 
African countries: immediate cause (lack of infrastructure, weak and undiversified economies, 
and small intra-regional trade), underlying cause (political conflicts and instability) and root 
cause (lack of democratic political system).
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Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay and Elliot Green (2013)27 argue that the debates of 
national integration and nation building in Africa have been central issues of interest for 
scholars and politicians since the independence decade of the 1950s and 1960s. Not few in 
academia cite colonial legacy as one of the main factors that continue to stand on the way of 
socio-political and economic progress of African countries. Many believe that it imposed 
fundamental changes in the cultural geography, political and economic relations of the people 
of the continent. The European powers which carved the continent in 1884-1885 without any 
consideration to the human geography “drew new political borders that divided established 
governments and cultural groups. These new boundaries also forced different cultural groups 
to live together. This restructuring process brought out cultural tensions, causing deep ethnic 
conflict that continues today.”28 A paper by AfDB argues that, Africa’s current unsuccessful 
regional integration attempts cannot be understood without looking back into history. It notes 
that the chain of horrendous external interference (slave trade, colonization following the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-85, and Neo-colonialism) had brought “a long period of confusion” 
and “set Africans off balance.” Therefore, this political disorientation, the paper emphasizes, 
in turn makes the economic direction of the continent also disoriented.29
Emmy Irobi (2013)30 argues that when the colonial powers drew new ethnic maps, 
they sowed new seeds of division among the otherwise closely related ethnic groups; by 
creating ethnic boundaries and identities, they set the stage for poly-ethnic intolerance and 
“neglect of the existence of minorities”; by organizing a census, they carved out different 
ethnic minorities and provided them with ethnonyms. All these colonial intrigues of 
superficial/artificial ethnic identities not only created and resettled ethnic groups in Africa, 
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but also altered their economic, social and political life in a way that can easily be exploited 
and trigger conflicts. Irobi posits that the problems of ethnicity and tribalism, religious 
polarization, poverty and economic stagnation, national language and regionalism are the 
main but not the only hurdles that stalled the national integration and nation-building projects 
of post-colonial African countries. African leaders’ lack of willingness to embrace democratic 
principles and institutions to deal with these problems and their preference of single party 
system as the best strategy to accelerate nation-building threw the whole nation-building 
process in to further confusion.31 The argument is, as humans are naturally attached to their 
ethnic group (primordial theory of ethnicity), ethnically heterogeneous societies are always 
prone to political instability and conflicts.  
However, can conflicts and civil wars be directly attributed to ethnic and religious 
diversity alone? A considerable body of literature refutes this line of argument. Irobi (2013) 
argues that ethnicity is not a unique feature of Africa, but because of its poor management in 
Africa, more often than not it is politicized; it has become a major challenge for national 
integration, which in turn has a detrimental effect on the whole nation-building process. 
Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) evaluate nine different nation building policies 
implemented by African countries to enhance national integration after their independence. 
The nation-building policies they examined include changing state names, changing capital 
cities’ names and locations, changing national currencies, conscription and national service, 
religious and linguistic homogenization, republican and centralization policies, one-party 
state, non-ethnic censuses, and land nationalization. The authors used logistic regression and 
survival analysis to examine the correlation of these policies with the intended nation-
building. With the findings of their logistic regression, they concluded that nation building 
policies were not effective to prevent civil wars. On the other hand, through their survival 
analysis they found that these nation building policies are indeed closely related with the 
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onset of civil wars. This analysis suggests that ethno-linguistic fractionalization does not have 
a strong link to nation-building. They further argue that “variables such as state name, 
currency, land, centralization and religion and language are significantly positively correlated 
with civil war onset across several specifications.”32
Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) maintain that the failure of these nation building 
policies to prevent the onset of civil wars show that they were not genuine policies, but rather 
promoted by the self-seeking leaders to enhance their grip on power. Therefore, most of the 
time instead of enhancing national integration, they became a source of national 
disintegration. Finally, they conclude, contrary to general belief, nation building policies in 
Africa are prone to result in civil wars rather than to achieve peace and stability. 
The World Bank's Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2011) also claim that 
ethno-linguistic diversity has no direct link to civil wars in Africa. Using empirical studies of 
166 countries between 1960 to 1999, with the help of new models of overall incidence of 
civil wars, they concluded that lack of meaningful nation-building process, "not tribal or 
ethnic hatred," is the primary cause for the lack of Africa's overall progress.33 Similarly, 
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2003), from Stanford University, examined 127 civil 
wars throughout the world from 1945 to 1999, which killed at least 16.2 million people, and 
found that in ethnically heterogeneous societies, ethnic or religious fractionalization by itself 
is not a source of conflict. They argue that "this finding runs contrary to a common view 
among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds 'plural' societies to be 
especially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms."34
From these different analyses and conclusions one can infer that, the post-colonial 
delicate nation-building process of multinational societies, a process where the interests of 
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the different sections of the society should be considered and managed wisely for the whole 
process to positively progress, has not achieved much of the desired outcomes: internally 
integrated and unified societies. Some of the country-level economic deficiencies, such as 
lack of infrastructure, transport, economic diversification and poor private sector, show that 
African states are not integrated in their domestic economy. This leads us to assume that the 
different ethnic groups within individual countries are not economically interdependent upon 
each other and do not interact with each other sufficiently. Politically, the different nation-
building policies pursued by African leaders and governments aimed to underpin common 
national identity on the expense of ethnic groups, highlighted by the famous declaration of 
former Mozambican President Samora Machel, “for the nation to live, the tribe must die,”35
were not effective. As many research endeavors have proved, throughout the post-colonial 
period, these policies rather generated mistrust among the people which in turn caused 
political instabilities and conflicts that continue to weaken the countries supposed to be the 
building-blocks of the greater regional integration. Surprisingly, democratization, as it is 
considered factional and as such disfavored for one-party systems, was not one of those 
policies. I believe that the nexus of failure both in nation-building and consequently in 
regional integration, emanates from here, because domestically disintegrated countries, both 
politically and economically, cannot successfully integrate regionally. Regional integration is 
inherently democratic structure, with democratic mechanisms of decision and policy making
characterized by lengthy negotiations, compromises and consensus, in which all participants 
are equal without one state dictating the others. Therefore, states that suffer from democratic 
deficit domestically find it difficult to democratically marry with other countries in a regional 
integration. This argument invites us to look into the experience of the EU, the most 
successful regional economic integration in the world so far, in comparison with Africa’s 
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experience and ask a simple question: Why did the Western European economic integration 
succeed while African attempt continue to crumble? 
Ever since the AU replaced OAU in 2002, many scholars took the challenge to 
compare AU with EU, and their findings are vastly similar: the AU is, at least structurally, a 
copy of the EU. Babarinde’s (2007) comparison finds that there is indeed close similarity in 
terms of the names of institutional structures and their functions. Sougrynoma Z. Sore (2010) 
agrees and believes it is natural as far as AU is modeling itself after the EU. He emphasizes 
that “…. with a few exceptions, the AU is almost the mirror image of the EU.”36For 
Babarinde (2007) this similarity stems from the fact that many of the African leaders are 
inspired by the success of the EU. He also argues that both entities have similar goals –
achieving peace and stability and economic prosperity of their regions through regional 
integration. 
However, many scholars agree that replicating the EU in institutional structures and 
names cannot be the magic wand and push the African integration process. Therefore, they 
take their comparison beyond the structures deep into the values and principles both 
organizations adhere to, the political environment in which they operate and the process they 
undertook to achieve their goals. Siaroff (2007) argues that OAU started as politically and 
economically non-binding organization with no accession criteria and no need to apply for 
membership, except being African geographically and the vote of a simple majority of the 
members, which makes it easy to join the organization. This implies that, from the very 
beginning the OAU/AU integration scheme lacked “…any effective political structures… 
[and] any specific economic focus.”37 On the other hand, he argues, the European Union 
integration process, from the very beginning in the 1950s, started strongly because its 
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founding communities, especially The European Coal and Steel Community, required the 
surrender of sectoral sovereignty, which discouraged many European countries from joining 
and limited the membership to the six founding members until the 1970s. Siaroff further 
elucidates that going through a formal application process has been the norm for the EU 
membership. Dedman (1996) adds that the membership into EC is conditional on democratic 
system of government and subject to lengthy negotiations, as witnessed by the entry 
negotiations for Spain and Portugal, which took eight years (1978-1986) and Greece’s six 
years (1975-1981). This is to ensure that the applicant countries’ political and economic 
systems are in harmony and consistent with what is required and existed in the Community.38
Sebastián Royo (2002) further explains that from the very beginning in 1950, the 
Schuman plan for European integration specifically invited the democratic governments of 
Europe only. That's why Spain and Portugal, which were under dictatorships, did not join the 
ECSC. According to Royo, the Spanish formal request to join the EC in 1962 aroused strong 
opposition from civic groups, organizations and newspapers and calls for the EC to reject it. 
They demanded that Spain embrace democracy and liberty first. Royo argues that this firm 
membership requirement paid off to stimulate democratic reforms as witnessed by the strong 
public opposition in Spain when Colonel Tejero attempted to overthrow the new democratic 
government in 1981.39
Siaroff (2007) argues that after the end of the cold war, on the expectation of new 
members from the Former Soviet Union countries, the EU strengthened its membership 
criteria and made sure that only the countries which fully adhere to the EU values like liberal 
democracy, strong market economy and have “the economic and administrative ability to 
adopt the acquis communautaire”40 will get the nod to join the EU. Siaroff notes that, for the 
purpose of European integration, “Europeanness” is not primarily determined by geography, 
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but by such factors as geopolitics (during the cold war), a grouping of democracies (the post-
cold war era), and high level of socio-economic development (including industrialization). 
However, Siaroff believes that the lack of clarity and consensus on the definition of 
“Europeanness” based on these criteria can best be countered by “the political criteria for 
membership [which] gives the members a clear sense of cohesion.”41 His argument is, the 
political symmetry (being liberal democracy) among the EU members guarantees effective
integration. On the other hand, Siaroff explains that, in Africa autocratic governments, 
whether they allow some freedoms or no freedoms, outnumber the democratic countries. 
Therefore, he concludes that “these variations in democratization – or more specifically the 
large number of autocracies which are members - will prevent any serious political union in 
Africa.”42 Siaroff claims, even though the Consultative Act of the AU addresses issues of 
respect of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, and 
condemnation of those governments that come to power unconstitutionally, it has many 
loopholes or unaddressed issues that weaken the whole Act and hinder its effectiveness for 
integration. Even though Siaroff entertains the idea that making democratic principles a 
condition for (continued) membership would strengthen AU’s effectiveness with regard to 
promotion of democratic values in Africa, he is more worried that it would reduce the 
membership of the Union.43
Siaroff (2007) does not offer sufficient explanation of the relationship between 
democracy and regional integration. Why Europeans are obsessed with democratization as a 
precondition for membership in EC/EU? How democratization of African countries can 
facilitate their integration? Or why is the issue of democratization raised in relation with 
regional integration? Furthermore, he does not offer mechanisms through which AU can 
promote democratic cohesion (political cohesion), which is a fundamental element to 
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establish effective cooperation. Siaroff’s further shortcoming is that he looked into 
integration from the political viewpoint only, which limits the scope of his analysis. EU’s 
integration process was clearly and fundamentally economic, though the driving force behind 
was political.
Throughout this literature review I have tried to demonstrate that African countries 
face four existential challenges to establish a successful regional integration: incomplete 
nation-building process and hence national disintegration; low intra-regional trade, whose 
root causes go deep beyond the banal explanations; lack of shared values and principles; and 
limitations of imitating the European Union. As a considerable body of the existing literature 
agrees, the nation-building process has not yielded the desired states, which are domestically 
integrated countries. African intra-regional trade and economic interdependence, other very 
crucial factors for regional economic integration, are lagging behind Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas. Political asymmetry of the continent is another major factor impeding the progress 
of regional integration in Africa. Based on these explanations, it is not an unrealistic to opine 
that African countries embarked on their regional integration project before they themselves 
had matured politically and economically into complete states. And finally, the AU’s top-
down model of integration, institutionalism, that imposes institutional structures of the EU on 
the African context, will only protract the long wait or even could be futile. 
2.1.Summary and Implications
Regional integration, as defined in the above, is a process or act of combining two or 
more things into a whole. This implies that it is a bottom-up process, functionalism, where to 
have a successful whole you need to start with strong and well-functioning building blocks. 
Western Europe has succeeded in building a strong union, because the building blocks/the 
foundations (the sates) were strong as functioning units politically and economically, whereas 
Africa has continued to fail to build a sustainable integration precisely because the building 
blocks are fragile. Therefore, the contrasting experiences on regional integration by African 
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countries on the one hand and Western Europe on the other indicates there is a precondition 
to be met on the national/domestic level before embarking on regional integration process. 
This thesis will argue that, the precondition to build a successful regional integration is the 
promotion of democracy in the national level. The lack of strong democratic governance is 
causing multifaceted challenges to African countries, which in turn these undemocratic 
countries and their political, economic and social conditions hinder the integration process. 
The fact of the matter is, African countries themselves have been the problem to overcome to 
achieve the goal. Therefore, reforming the African states is the prerequisite for the grand 
project which should be given a priority.
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Chapter 3: The Origin and state of the African Nation-State
The nation-state is a social construct that has been with us since the Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648. In the late 18th century, the French and American revolutions further 
buttressed the idea of nation-state. The aggressive European colonial expansion of the 19th 
century in many parts of the world and creation of colonial states played a vital role in 
spreading the ideals of nation-state throughout the world. The dynamics and the different 
nature of the process of nation-state formation in different periods and different places make
it difficult to settle on one definitive definition of a nation-state. It greatly varies between the 
scholars of the field. Definitions range from, “a state whose primary loyalty is to a cultural 
self-identity, which we call a nation or nationality”44; “the ideological belief that the 
population of one state consists entirely of the members of one national group”45; “an 
independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal 
citizens.” 46 However there is a general consensus that the nation-state comprises four 
important characteristics: a culturally homogenous population or a nation (people who have a 
common belief that they are connected to each other or people that possess a sense of 
common identity), living in defined geographical territory under an organized form of 
government, and enjoy sovereignty or self-rule. 
Most modern countries or nation-states of the world exhibit all or most of the above 
mentioned characteristics. For example, in May 2013, based on a 2002 paper commissioned 
by Harvard Institute of Economic Research, which was aimed at measuring ethnic diversity 
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around the world, Washington Post published a map47 that reveals world’s most and least 
ethnically diverse countries. The map shows that Europe and Northeast Asian countries have 
the most homogenous societies in the world. It further argues that, in Europe most of the 
“large ethnic groups have a country of their own.”48The map’s interesting revelation is that 
the more the countries or nation-states are homogenous, the more they are politically stable 
and economically rich. Moreover, it highlights two very important and instructive points. 
First, the more one country is ethnically diverse, the more conflicts it experiences. Second, 
the more ethnically homogeneous the country is, the stronger democracy it establishes. Not 
surprisingly, the map reveals that Sub-Saharan African countries own ethnically the most 
heterogeneous societies. It adds that, “the world's 20 most diverse countries are all African.”49
Therefore, in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries or ‘nation-states’, though there is a 
defined geographical territory, some form of organized government and sovereignty, the 
existence of one of the most important characteristics and foundations of a nation-state –
cultural homogeneity – is very weak. Therefore, it is easier to call African countries as 
‘nations-state’ rather than a nation-state. As many historians and scholars of political science 
agree and as it can also be observed from the experience of Europe or Northeast Asian 
countries, or even the countries with relatively less homogenous societies (such as the 
Americas), the state or government is formed by and protects to a nation. This implies that 
the state is formed by a particular nation to fulfill its economic prosperity, political stability 
and security. This further implies the formation of a nation-state arises from the internal 
demand of a nation with a clear objective of self-rule. In light of this historical background,
Africa’s current economic sluggishness, political instability and subsequent failure of its 
integration efforts can be attributed to the skewed nation-state formation process that greatly 
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varies from that of Europe, Northeast Asia or Americas. The African colonial ‘nations-state’, 
unlike the European Westphalian nation-state, was artificially created by European colonizers
and imposed on Africans. 
The modern African countries (‘nations-states’) are the outcome of the Berlin 
conference of 1884-85. European colonialists applied the European concept of nation-state, 
“one nation within the state,”50 by bringing together various ethnic or tribal groups into one 
state. The conference was what is called "exogenous intervention"51 into otherwise natural 
process (the conventional West European way of nation-state construction – city states 
develop in to nation-states or empires break-up when the different subjugated nations revolt 
and establish their own nation-state) of the construction of nation-state; or revolutionary 
approach to the delicate process as it cuts across all the sensitive social, political and 
economic issues of the different groups touched by the course of action. This means the 
nation-state with all its alien structures was imposed on the African subjects neither with their 
consensus nor with their participation. The history and experience of European nation-state 
formation, especially Western Europe, followed and completed its natural evolutionary or 
revolutionary process of nation-state construction that culminated with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. The treaty of Westphalia was what is called "indigenous intervention"52
to the natural nation-state formation process. The difference between ‘internal intervention’ 
(indigenous process) and ‘external intervention’ is that, in the former, the people who are 
directly affected by the outcome or “those whose nation it is or will be”53are the primary 
players and owners of the whole nation-state formation and subsequent nation-building 
process. And there is a greater chance that the outcome will be acceptable and satisfactory to 
all parties. Whereas in the latter, there is no direct or indirect participation of the people 
                                                     
50Colin Flint, "Nation-State," Encyclopaedia of Human Geography. Ed. . Thousand Oaks, (CA: SAGE, 2006) 2. 
SAGE Reference Online. Web. 31 Jul. 2012.
51 Carolyn Stephenson, “Nation Building,” on-line at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation-
building, accessed 20 April 2014.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
29
directly affected by the outcome, as in the case of Africa. Therefore, the greater the chance 
that the outcome will not reflect their needs.
Africans, whether the Kings, chiefs, elites or representatives of the different tribes, 
ethnic groups or social and political entities, did not take part in the drawing of African 
borders in Berlin. Africans did not have a say on how the ethnic groups or nations be divided 
or amalgamated to form a new state. The borders were drawn far away from African people 
and African land. But they were also far away in their spirit, words and aspirations of 
Africans. Not only the borders, but also the new and synthetic African ‘nation-states’ which 
was forced on them, reflect the desires and aspirations of the colonialists. The colonial 
African ‘nations-state’ was not designed to fulfill the economic prosperity, political stability 
and security of Africans, but rather to advance the colonial ambitions: exploitation of African 
wealth. The Europeans were well aware of the nation-state formation in Europe; it was 
evolutionary not revolutionary, except in the break-up empires in Eastern Europe. They knew 
that the modern nation-states of Europe were the outcome of long and protracted wars and 
subsequent agreements and treaties between different nations and ethnic groups. The history 
of expansion and contraction of different kingdoms in Europe, raids and counter-raids 
between different nations of Europe, the consequent shaping and reshaping of geographical 
territories controlled by one nation and the convergence of the people who claim to belong to 
this particular nation to its defined geographical territories and submission of other smaller or 
weak tribes, who seek protection, preceded the Treaty of Westphalia. This treaty was the 
outcome of direct negotiations and a series of peace treaties between the warring parties of 
mostly Western European forces. It brought together mostly or dominantly one nation in to 
one state with clearly defined borders. According to Charles Tilly, the cultural homogeneity 
of Europe was in the making for hundreds of years long before the 17th century. Therefore, 
almost 150 years before Westphalia, Europe had, inter alia, “a kind of cultural homogeneity 
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only rivaled, at such a geographic scale, by that of china.”54So, when the modern European 
nation-state, through the Treaty of Westphalia, emerged the people who inhabited in the 
defined territories were largely homogeneous in terms of cultural/national self-identity with 
very few minority nations, who not only accepted the domination of the larger groups, but 
also felt their interests and survival will be better served under such organization. Therefore, 
when the European borders were drawn, it was rare to see borders dividing one nation into 
two different countries or it was difficult to incorporate one tribe unwillingly with other polity. 
The drawing of the borders which carefully considered the human geography, then, gave rise 
to countries relatively in peace with themselves and their neighbors. The European 
experience clearly explains violence and conflict is part and parcel of nation-state formation 
and nation-building process. It further elucidates, Europeans have gone through the ravines of 
those conflicts and violence before they establish an enduring nation-state. Unlike the 
European experience of nation-state formation which gave rise to relatively stable and robust 
countries, the African experience of ‘nations-state’ formation, which was externally driven 
and accomplished, produced countries with weak and fragile social cohesion, that are beset 
domestically by civil wars based on ethnic or national identity and natural resources (grazing 
land, water...) and border disputes with their neighboring countries.
When the six European countries initiated the economic integration process in the 
1950s, the nation-state in Europe was over 300 years old with well established and 
functioning political and economic institutions. It was not only capable of governing its own 
domestic affairs, but also projecting its political, economic and social influence to and 
colonizing other peoples far away from Europe. It was a state that can survive two total wars 
which ravaged Europe twice within twenty-five years. What was seen in the break-up 
empires of Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empires prior and after the WWI, the disintegration 
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of USSR and Yugoslavia in the early 1990's have similar trends to what happened after the 
Treaty of Westphalia - the emergence of dominantly a single nation based countries.
Europe was required to embark on its nation-building process after it achieved a 
relatively stable nation-state or stable political system – constitutional governments with 
powerful parliaments, democratization, civil society, free press…etc. However, Africa was 
required to set off to its nation-building process when it is still preoccupied with chaotic and 
complex challenges of nation-state formation. The different African ethnic groups who were 
amalgamated together as one nation-state by imperial design were yet to come to terms with 
the fact that their destiny is tied to be one nation-state or country with its rival neighboring 
ethnic group with whom it was engaging, may be, in continuous conflict and violence due to 
scarce natural resources (like grazing land or water), or practicing historical mutual hatred 
and suspicion nurtured by the reciprocal raids and counter-raids during the slave trade prior to 
the arrival of formal European colonization. To compound the issue, the European colonizers 
further widened and exploited the mutual mistrust and animosity between the different ethnic 
groups of one colony to advance their colonial goals. The colonial policies, such as the
British ‘divide and rule’ and the Belgian ‘ethnic ID cards’ and favoring one ethnic group over 
the other have proved to be the Achilles heel of the future independent African nation-state.
The different ethnic groups which were fused together within an arbitrary boundary tended to 
look into such kind of new political institution as undermining their safety and security. As a 
result, they retreated back from engaging in the new ‘nations-state’ and sought refuge in their 
own ethnic group and became more loyal to it than the ‘nations-state’. In this kind of 
situation and with this kind of people’s mindset, the new ‘nations-state’ of Africa was 
required to embark on the delicate and difficult journey of nation-building process. Civil wars 
and genocides in Rwanda and Burundi; civil wars, ethnic animosity and frequent military 
cope d’états in Nigeria; the two deadly civil wars in Uganda; the social incompatibility 
between the Northern and Southern parts of Sudan and the resultant civil war between the 
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two regions and the crisis in Darfur; the decades long civil war and political instability in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire); the post-election 2007 ethnic conflict in 
Kenya; the Muslim-Christian conflict in Central African Republic; the over 50 years Tuareg 
rebellions in Mali; and many other such incidents in the entire continent have all their seeds
planted during colonial period. The civil wars that erupted right after many African countries 
gained their independence and persisted for many years simply demonstrate that the 
artificially created African nation-state was not ready to live in peace with itself as an 
independent political entity and pursue its nation-building process peacefully. 
3.1.Nation-building process of the African Nation-State
The African nation-building process is another daunting bulwark of African 
integration. At the time colonial African states were gaining their independence from 
European colonizers and embarking on their nation-building process, “Nation-Building” as a 
field of study gained much prominence from the 1950s up until 1970s among such gigantic 
scholars of political science as Karl Deustch, Charles Tilly, and Reinhard Bendix, who 
developed different theories and understandings of its meaning. However divergent the 
theories or arguments were, they all converged on the idea that the goal of nation-building is 
primarily targeted “to describe the processes of national integration and consolidation that led 
up to the establishment of the modern nation-state--as distinct from various form of 
traditional states, such as feudal and dynastic states, church states, empires, etc.”55 This 
unambiguously implies that nation-building process entails a conscious act of social 
engineering towards creating a commonly accepted national identity among the inhabitants of 
exclusive geographical area. Therefore, the conscious nature of the process involves leaders 
who engineer the process, resources to invest, institutions (such as the military, educational 
system and mass media) to mobilize, theories, models and strategies to pursue.
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The ‘African nation-state’, the brainchild of colonialists, right after independence 
found itself embroiled both in the concept and practice of nation-building. Not only did it 
inherit culturally heterogeneous ethnic groups which compete with each other, but also the 
spirit of the colonial practices of governance, such as the right to impose the leader’s will on 
the subjects and the use of force if one fails to comply with the will of the leader, which 
sharply puts itself at loggerheads with the whole nation-building process. The colonialists 
neither practiced consensus based governance nor encouraged a political system that 
empowers, represents and listens to the people. On the other hand, most of the African leaders 
or politicians who took over the helmets of newly independent African countries on their part 
never tried to introduce such states or a political system that is accountable and transparent to 
the people. Rather, a political system, just like the colonial political system, that imposes its 
rule without the consent of the ruled and an economic system that exploits the local people 
and thwarts economic empowerment of the general population. When the colonialists handed 
over the button of leadership to hand-picked African leaders during the independence years, 
the new leaders took it for granted that they are to remain at the helm for life. Given that 
during the colonial years the colonialists’ best strategy to control and rule the people was to 
antagonize the different ethnic groups of the new African nation-states with each other
through their different divisive policies, it was obvious the new leaders face challenges from 
the other ethnic groups while their own ethnic groups stand for them. To counter such 
challenges from the outset, it was apparent that the new leaders surround themselves with 
their trusted kinsmen and direct public funds to the benefit of their own ethnic group as well 
as to suppress dissent from remaining ethnic groups. Therefore, in many African countries a 
small circle of elite and their families took power and embarked on enriching themselves 
economically and dominating the multinational nation-state politically. In the process, the 
ethnic group from which the leader in power hails, benefits economically and politically at
the expense of other ethnic groups in the country. This does not bode well with the other 
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ethnic groups. The fact that political power is not shared equally, where the other ethnic 
groups are not represented in the government, and opportunities for economic improvement 
are monopolized provides a strong recipe for infighting among the different ethnic groups.
It is evident that the African political leadership that took over power from the 
colonialists did not employ comprehensive policies to facilitate the nation-building process to 
effectively integrate the ethnically and religiously diverse societies under one nation-state.
Contrary to the desired outcome, Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013), argue that the nation-
building policies pursued by many African leaders have caused further conflicts and 
instability. As a result, their population remains disintegrated internally both politically and 
economically. Politically, the different ethnic groups within a particular country have not 
developed a sense of shared nationalism, loyalty to the nation-state rather than to the ethnic 
group. Economically, the failure of African governments to integrate their respective
countries domestically through investments on roads, communications, schools, hospitals and 
other major infrastructures to deliver much needed social services, such as education and 
health, and to connect the domestic markets kept the population fragmented and cornered in 
their geographic locations. In most African countries, a market system that helps bring all the 
diverse ethnicities to trade, interact and build trust with each other and subtly subdues their 
parochial ethno-religious and racial identities and attitudes has not developed. Hence, when 
politically and economically considered, the cost of conflict is low for the ethnic groups 
which are disadvantaged or marginalized in the system. Thus, these states in turn are 
vulnerable and exposed to continuous conflicts within their borders.
Nationalism, loyalty to ones’ nation, which is one of the critical elements of nation-
building process, is naturally associated with one nation or is the manifestation of pride and 
patriotism towards a commonly accepted national identity. In a multiethnic or multinational 
country, like African states, it is increasingly difficult to develop one and all encompassing 
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national identity, where all the different ethnic groups transcend their ethnic identity and 
embrace a common ‘nationalism’ which is politically constructed and imposed by leaders. As 
Rupert Emerson points out, “Family, tribe, locality, religion, conscience, economic interest, 
and a host of other appeals may at any given time and place prevail over national allegiance 
for particular individuals or groups.”56This has been one of the major challenges in African 
nation-building process as the political leaders have to construct one-fits-all national identity 
to their post-colonial multinational states. This process, however, is inherently violent (not 
only violent which can result in civil wars but also can cause secession of ethnic groups such 
as the active or defunct conflicts in Darfur in Sudan, Tuaregs (Azawad) in Mali, Western 
Sahara in Morocco, Biafra and Niger Delta in Nigeria, Oromo and Ogaden in Ethiopia, 
Anjouan in Comoros, Katanga and Kivu in Democratic Republic of Congo and many others), 
as witnessed by the experience of African states, since it requires the suppression of ethnic 
identity and affiliation in favor of the ‘bigger’ national identity. Samora Machel, who was the 
president of Mozambique from 1975 –1986, sums this challenge in his famous quote, “for the 
nation to live, the tribe must die.” This argument, as some political scientists warn, however,
promotes the convergence of ethnic diversity to one national culture or identity and in the 
process the elimination of some ethnic groups or nations. This social engineering, if not 
supplemented by investments in strategic infrastructures which subtly enhance the nation-
building process, naturally leads to political opposition and conflicts, as was and still is in 
Africa. Governments of multinational states not only persistently face political opposition 
now and then, which keeps them obsessed to secure their political power by investing 
enormous resources diverting away from national development, but also violent conflicts that 
range from the possibility of genocide of millions to secession, where the different 
nationalities or ethnic groups seek to establish their own independent nation-state. As these 
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kinds of conflicts are further complicated with ethnic, tribal and religious issues, it is difficult 
to device a lasting solution. In these kinds of states, it is easy to manipulate ethnic loyalty and 
feeling to political ends. Most of the political oppositions in Africa, for example, concealed in 
peaceful democratic movements or armed opposition, have economic and political grievances 
deeply rooted on ethnic discrimination or marginalization. Most of the post-colonial states, 
especially the ‘African nation-states’ with multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, suffered 
not only from the frequent armed uprisings, but also from the heavy-handed government 
responses. Lee Kuan Yew, widely regarded as the Father of Singapore, a multi-ethnic country 
and former colony of Britain, has put this dilemma as follows: “Where the common national 
experience is colonial rule, especially when the state comprises diverse ethnic groups, 
political opposition is often considered an assault on the political validity of the state rather 
than of a particular government.”57 In such a situation, governments pretend as having no 
choice, but to ‘defend the territorial integrity, stability and security’ of the state at any cost to 
crush the opposition. This is the challenge almost the entire African continent is still going 
through in its nation-state and nation-building process since the independence years. These 
conflicts and political instabilities continue to deprive the continent stability and constantly 
keep it derailed from its economic development endeavors. According to one report, from 
1990 until 2006, Africa has lost $284 billion due to conflicts in 23 countries.58 If these 
figures were extrapolated to the previous three decades of African independence, the 
economic cost of the conflicts that have been devastating Africa could reach well over a 
trillion dollar; and this is without taking into account the human toll of the conflicts. The 
African nation-building process, therefore, is riddled with political instabilities and conflicts,
which destroyed the little infrastructure built during colonial times to serve the interests of the 
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colonialists and exacerbated the economic situation of the continent from bad to worse. 
However, this does not mean that all the conflicts that engulfed post-independence African 
countries were only internally driven. The hands of former European colonialists, the Cold 
War rivalry between USA and USSR, and the wrong economic policies prescribed by IMF 
and World Bank all had directly or indirectly triggered wars, coups d’états and political 
instabilities. Nonetheless, it is not the objective of this paper to deeply analyze these external 
interferences and their influence on the African nation-building process. But rather, they are 
treated as part and parcel of the conflicts gripping Africa. It is also pertinent to remember that, 
external hands were always manipulating the domestic situation and was playing its 
destructive role concealed in the national actors. Therefore, domestic and external factors of 
conflict and political instability are the reason why Africa has so far failed to yield strong 
states, both politically and economically, which can confidently embark on the integration 
vision of the continent.
3.2.Coups and conflicts in Africa
When writing or talking about regional integration attempts in Africa, many 
researchers and commentators fail to address the impacts of conflicts and military coup 
d’états on the process of integration in the last over 50 years. Sometimes the analysis 
completely forgets this fact to the extent that creates an impression of regional integration 
that has been going on under a normal circumstance. Many scholars, including those annual 
reports produced by African Union itself, treat the regional integration process and the 
conflicts that have been ravaging the continent since the independence years either separately
or give it less focus on discussing how to expedite the integration process. This approach 
(failure to recognize the conflicts and coup d’états as the core impediments to the very slow 
integration process in Africa) undoubtedly led to flawed conclusions and remedies. For 
example, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) I (2004) and II (2006), Policy 
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Research Reports published jointly by the African Union and Economic Commission for 
Africa (one of the main bodies of African Union) state that peace and security as one of the 
many challenges of integration, but not the main one. Furthermore, ARIA I timidly call for 
somehow democratic governance as criteria for membership, while ARIA II gives more 
emphasis on the role regional economic communities are playing “to prevent conflicts, 
resolve them when they arise, and secure peace once it is achieved.”59Both reports fail to 
thoroughly analyze the setbacks caused by conflicts and military coups on the integration 
process. However, ARIA II admits conflicts can hinder regional economic integration for 
many reasons. “First, conflicts in any member of a regional economic community undermine 
economic integration and growth throughout the entire community. Countries in conflict 
cannot focus on integration. Second, conflicts create distrust. Third, conflicts divert resources 
that could be used to strengthen national economies and promote regional integration. Fourth, 
conflicts result in contraction of markets and erection of nontariff barriers to regional 
trade.”60 As it can clearly be understood from the four reasons mentioned, conflicts pose the 
greatest challenge for regional integration as it takes away countries’ focus from the process, 
creates distrust among the countries supposed to integrate economically, diverts resources 
and breaks down markets by creating tariff barriers among states. If all these challenges are 
caused by the existence of conflict, all the other challenges mentioned by many scholars and 
AU’s own researches, namely weak intra-regional trade in Africa, lack of infrastructure, less 
economic diversification, poor implementation of regional integration agreements, 
overlapping membership in regional economic communities, non-observance of the rule of 
law and good governance, poor private sector and civil society participation and 
unwillingness to yield sovereignty to a supranational body are the by-products, especially in 
Africa, of the absence of peace and security. The reason is plain: Politically unstable country, 
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either because of internal conflicts or war with neighboring country, cannot put aside its 
political survival in favor of implementing those expensive and complex projects. A country 
ever gripped in an unabated political turmoil faces a continuous change of governments
which in turn results in stop-start and interruption of overall national economic and political 
programs. As most of the governments in Africa that have been taking power were either 
through military coups, conflicts or revolution, it is most unlikely to continue the political 
programs of the previous regime. They always come with their own focus and priorities. But 
for political reasons, such as getting regional support or to present themselves as responsible 
stakeholders in front of their people and the world, most leaders who come to power by force 
express their acceptance to the regional economic integration schemes and their readiness to 
work with all their neighboring states to achieve that goal. ECA and AU joint research 
indicates that for 50% of the countries the major determinant to join more than one regional 
economic community is “political and strategic reasons.” Surprisingly, economic reason was 
placed second, “with only 35% countries citing it.”61
Africa’s experience with conflicts and coup d’états in the last 50 years buttresses the 
above mentioned trend significantly. Even though evidence shows to the contrary, many 
researches try to argue that African conflicts have reduced since the end of the Cold War. 
However, considering around 20 African countries are politically unstable in 2016 due to 
ongoing conflicts either within their borders or with their neighbors, that argument miserably 
fails. Furthermore, evidence shows that the number of conflicts in Africa actually increased 
since 1990. The two decades (1990-2010) that followed after the collapse of USSR, have 
seen 27 conflicts each, which puts them joint top in terms of registering the highest number 
of conflicts in Africa since the independence years of 1960s. These are the worst and brutal 
20 years in post-independence Africa with the Somali civil war (1991-going on), Djibouti 
civil war (1991-1994), Rwandan civil war and genocide (1990-1994), Burundian civil war
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many neighboring countries (1996
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conflict (2005-2010), insurgency in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia
election Kenyan crisis and massacre 
goingon), all happened in these years and claimed the lives of millions of Africans and 
damage to property worth billions of dollars. 
Likewise, since the independence years of the 1960s military coup d’états have been 
a common occurrence in African politics. 
around 130 attempted but failed 
the result of conflicts or opened the gates for 
with certainty which causes what; it is clear that both the conflicts and coups are the 
outcomes of bad governance. To add insult to injury, many of these coups reversed several 
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The consequence of these 
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3.3.Evolution of Democracy in Africa
Since the mid of the 20th
thrive. There was a time in the post
when all African countries but Botswana were under undemocratic regimes. Moreover, there 
is no a single year when more than 10
or democratic. According to Freedom House, "
scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant 
independent civic life, and independent media.
African record on democratic governance
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Economic Research found that democracy is positively correlated with ethnic homogeneity.64
Even though the paper did not specify which influences which, it is clear that in countries 
where many ethnic groups live together, there is shaky democratic governance. Ethnic 
diversity by itself only cannot be a reason for political instability or conflict. However, as 
discussed above, ethnic mismanagement always instigates conflicts. 
For the last over 50 years Africa has not shown much progress in its democratization 
efforts. There were some countries, such as Cameroon, Central African Republic, Madagascar, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Uganda which started promisingly as democracies, 
but soon fell under military junta or authoritarian leaders. There are also some countries 
which have found themselves ruled by single-party for decades. Many countries, such as 
Ethiopia and Morocco, started as monarchies, before the former fell to military junta. 
Botswana is the only country in Africa enjoying democratic governance since the 1960s.
Mauritius (since early 1980s), Benin, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe (all since the 
early 1990s) are the other countries with established democracies for over two decades. In 
general, however, the number of democratic countries in Africa in any given decade was very 
low compared to the total number of countries in the continent. For example, since the year 
2000, the number of the countries described as free by Freedom House has never increased 
from nine. Moreover, most of the time it is the small and economically weak countries,
except South Africa and Ghana, which constantly feature in the democracies club of Africa,
not the big and economically stronger. (According to the Freedom House's report titled, 
"Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2016", it is only Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, and South Africa which are considered free 
countries in Africa. Since 2013, Mali dropped out from this group and replaced by Senegal.)65
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Therefore, it is difficult for them to get out of the shadows of the big countries and influence 
the African affairs in general and the democratization process in particular. 
The graph below shows the growth of the number of democratic (free) countries in 
Africa since the 1960s. The graph reveals, right after independence and during the launching 
of the Organization of African Unity, eight (or one-forth) out of the 32 founding members 
were democratic countries. However, in the next two decades when the cold war was at its 
climax, this number sharply declined to just two democracies. After the end of the cold war 
that trend was reversed and the decade until 2000 saw the number of democracies in Africa 
hit its highest point. As of 2016, there were only nine (or below one-forth) African countries 
described as free or democratic. Therefore, in the last over half a century, the democratization 
of the African continent has actually regressed not progressed. The next chapter explores in 
detail how this failure of democratization affected the economic integration negatively.     
Table 4: Number of democratic African countries in every five years since 196066
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Chapter 4: Democracy and Regional Integration
In chapter two we have defined regional economic integration as the merger of different 
national economies of a region by eliminating various discriminatory barriers which enables 
those relatively small economies to be part of a bigger market which in turn opens the door 
for economic growth that leads to a higher level of national welfare. All levels of economic 
integration – starting from the lowest forms such as preferential trade agreement and free 
trade area to the highest forms of economic integration such as fiscal union and economic 
union, require different forms of agreements and surrendering some of the sovereign rights of 
countries to the supranational body to be established as a result of the agreements. These 
agreements are in turn the outcome of transparent debates in the national level that involves 
different groups representing different interests in the society. Therefore, governments cannot 
enter into agreements with other countries, where they are expected to yield some of the 
national sovereignty to supranational organization, without the support of the majority of the 
population. Likewise, governments cannot walkout from these agreements without the 
approval of the majority of the population, like what happened with ‘Brexit’, UK’s 
referendum to withdraw from the EU. Consent of the governed, therefore, is one of the key 
characteristics and important elements in foreign policy decision-making process in 
democratic governments. 
4.1.Cooperation between democracies and non-democracies 
If it is argued that there are structural and normative causes to enable sustainable peace 
between democracies and audience cost to influence the actions of their leaders to push them 
deliver on their commitments, can the same be said about peace and cooperation between 
democracies and non-democracies or among non-democracies? Is it possible that all countries 
regardless of their domestic political and economic asymmetry can have a successful 
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economic integration? To make this question more clear and simple, can democracies and 
non-democracies enter into a lasting cooperation and economic integration?
Even though it could be debatable and hard to give a conclusion with certainty, the 
experience in many parts of the world shows that attempts of economic integration or even 
close economic cooperation between democracies and non-democracies or among non-
democracies suffered a great deal of failures. After the end of WWII, when six countries of 
western Europe established the European Coal and Steel Cooperation and achieved early
success in bringing former arch-enemies to cooperate in the trade of coal and steel for the 
benefit and wellbeing of their citizens, many regions in the world were inspired to do just the 
same. At the core of the establishment of Organization of African Unity (1963), Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (1967), Gulf Cooperation Council (1981), Common Market of the 
South or Mercosur (1991), and other such regional economic blocs was to generate economic 
and political cooperation among the countries of their respective regions. Even the economic 
and political cooperation was only the prerequisite to their grand visions, which is economic 
integration followed by political unions. Unlike the countries of Western Europe, most of the 
other regions of the world (Africa, South East Asia, South America, Middle East and Central 
Asia) are endowed with much more diverse natural resources to cooperate on and trade with
each other. For the past several decades, those regional groupings have held many 
conferences and issued many declarations communicating their policies, plans and intentions 
to advance cooperation to exploit those natural resources for the benefit and wellbeing of 
their people. However, their actions to achieve success like that of Western Europe have not 
matched their rhetoric. Their efforts to push for their grand visions dealt major setbacks 
primarily because the domestic political systems of the building blocks – the member states -
for those big objectives are not ripe enough to allow them to concede or share some of their 
sovereignty to a supranational authority. Most of those regional groupings are comprised of 
states with different domestic political systems and types of governments ranging from 
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authoritarian, tyranny, one party system, communism and dictatorships to democracy; and
from kingdoms, emirates and monarchies to constitutional monarchies and parliamentary 
governments. Some of those governments have constitutional separation of powers, free and 
objective mass media, mature civil societies, freely and fairly contested elections, credible 
commitments and audience cost. Some governments are halfway to embracing all those 
characters and their domestic political system is shaky and vulnerable to internal shocks. 
Others simply lack these features and the supreme leader or authority is the law and order in 
the land. In a regional grouping where these types of different political systems exist, cross-
border wars between countries, internal civil war, political instability and failing to honour 
domestic and international commitments, which all hinder economic and political 
cooperation, are possible to a large extent. Governments which are not governed by the will 
of the people cannot be afraid of the audience cost. In the absence of the audience cost, 
governments cannot have serious interest to honour commitments they make and obligations 
they pledge. In an environment where there is no mechanism to control and hold accountable 
those governments which fail to their domestic audience and international partners, achieving 
economic and political cooperation becomes impossible, and difficult at best. 
The experience of the different regional groupings shows that the more democratic the 
bloc is the better the progress of economic integration process. On the other hand, the more 
one bloc suffers with the lack democratic political system, the slower the pace of the 
economic integration process. Some of the regional groupings mentioned above with some 
progress in their integration projects can be looked at in this perspective briefly before going 
into detail about the relationship between democratization and the process of economic 
integration in Africa. 
4.2.European Union
In 1952 six countries of Western Europe with robust democracy - the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed to cooperate on 
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the production and trade of coal and steel, thus establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Five years and intensive negotiations later, they signed the Treaties of 
Rome in March 25, 1957 to establish the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and European Economic Community (EEC). Eurotom was aimed at enhancing cooperation in 
the field of atomic energy while the EEC announced the creation of common market among 
the six nations. Through the treaty establishing the EEC, the six countries agreed to a free
trade, such as free movement of people, goods, services and capital. They also agreed to 
remove laws and policies that hinder market competition. Furthermore, the six nations agreed 
for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and common external trade policy to be 
administered by the rules and regulations governing the EEC. These agreements show that, 
within five years of its formation, the founding members of the ECSC have willingly 
surrendered part of their sovereignty to a supranational body to make the new form of 
economic cooperation functional. Therefore, these nations have agreed to let the 
supranational authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of the countries if they fail to 
honour the commitments they made through the different treaties. 
ECSC’s strong adherence to democratic domestic political systems of the potential 
member states was one of its strengths for a robust beginning. In 1950, when the pioneers of 
European economic integration process announced the Schuman Plan, they targeted only the 
democratic regimes of Europe to be part of the new initiative. As “Democracy was an 
unwritten requirement for applicant countries,”67 those undemocratic European governments 
which applied for membership in the community faced strong opposition from civil societies, 
political parties, newspapers and NGOs alike. Even though the Treaties of Rome did not 
clearly mention democracy as a membership requirement in EEC, the idea of having 
undemocratic regimes in the European club is highly unacceptable by both state and non-state 
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actors. For example, when Spain, under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco since 1936
applied to join the EEC in February 1962, it provoked strong opposition from different sides. 
Prior to Spain’s request, in January 1962 the European Parliamentary Assembly already 
debated about democratic conditionality as membership criteria for countries applying to join 
the EC. The Birkelbach Report which was prepared by Willy Birkelbach, a rapporteur of 
working group on association and membership application demanded that “states whose 
governments do not have democratic legitimacy and whose peoples do not participate in the 
decisions of the government, neither directly nor indirectly by freely-elected representatives, 
cannot expect to be admitted in the circle of peoples who form the European Communities. 
[T]he guaranteed existence of a democratic form of state, in the sense of a free political order, 
is a condition for membership.”68 In a similar fashion, non-state actors and civil societies, 
particularly the media, trade unions and political parties, such as Confederation of European 
Unions, the Congress of the European Federalist Movement, the Socialist Group of the 
European Parliament, Congress of the European Movement and many newspapers called for 
the rejection of the Spanish government’s request. A Dutch newspaper, Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Cournat, summed the concern of many organizations and civil societies of 
Spain’s potential inclusion to the community as follows: “The EC has to say no to Spain until 
the spirit of democracy and liberty are not present in the country.”69In its Fifth annual 
meeting in June 1962, which took place in Munich, the Congress of the European Movement 
in a direct response to Spain’s request strongly recommended that “integration of any country 
with Europe, whether in the form of full membership or of association, requires democratic 
institutions.”70The European Commission, faced with a pressure from both within the 
Community and outside, suspended all negotiations with Spain until the death of Franco and 
Spain’s transition to parliamentary democracy in 1975.Even then, when the negotiations to 
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allow Spain join the Community begun in 1978, it took eight years to prove the country’s 
political values and economic policies are fully compatible with the values and practices of 
the EC. It was only in 1986 that Spain was accepted as the new member of the Community.   
Portugal and Greece are other examples of European countries which were barred from 
joining the European community on the principle of democratic conditionality. Both 
countries’ requests to start negotiations regarding joining the EEC faced strong opposition
from all quarters similar to that of Spain not least because they were under similar dictatorial 
regimes. Portugal’s experience of its accession process to the EEC is no different from that of 
Spain. Portugal, under the authoritarian regime of Antonio Salazar since the early 1930s, was 
not one of the founding members of both ECSC and EEC, primarily “[d]ue to its non-
democratic nature of the political regime.”71 Though the country was one of the seven 
founding members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 along with the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria, it was keen on 
joining the politically-oriented European integration scheme which was taking a dominant 
shape in Western Europe in the form of EEC. Therefore, in 1962 and 1969 Portugal made its 
intent to join the Community through formal applications. However, on both occasions the 
EEC’s response was lukewarm at best, “as the EEC wanted Portugal to be more democratic 
and a pro-economic market.”72In 1968, Salazar suffered a stroke and was replaced by 
Marcelo Caetano, who maintained the Estado Novo (New State) until a military revolution 
deposed him in 1974.The military revolution, also known as the Carnation Revolution, set the 
country on democratic reforms and in 1976 the first parliamentary elections in over 40 years 
brought a democratic government. After the country’s transition to democratic political 
system, the EEC took the Portuguese quest for accession seriously. Accession negotiations 
lasted for eight years (1978-1986), and Portugal’s long journey to join the European 
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Community finally came to fruition when it formally acceded to the EEC together with Spain 
in 1986.
Greece formally sent an application of accession in 1959, to which request the EEC 
responded by signing the Association Agreement with the country in 1961. As the 
Association Agreement was a prerequisite for the full membership in the EEC, negotiations 
between Greece and the European Commission were well underway until 1967. However, 
both the negotiations and the Association Agreement were suspended when a group of 
Colonels led by George Papadopoulos overthrown the government in a military coup in April 
1967. Membership negotiations between Greece and the Commission resumed in 1975 only 
after the country returned to democracy with yet another military coup in 1974. Those 
negotiations lasted for six years until Greece’s accession to the EC in 1981. 
After the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the USSR, the European 
Community expecting a wave of membership applications from East and Central Europe’s 
former communist countries, it introduced the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Through these 
criteria, the Community made the democratic conditionality a formal requirement for 
membership. Therefore, all countries which are accepted for accession in the community 
must first satisfy the criteria before joining the Community. The Copenhagen criteria has 
three main conditions - political, economic and administrative and institutional capacity - to 
be met by any candidate country, with the political criteria in particular calling for “stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities.”73 The Copenhagen criteria ensure the Community has states of the 
same political and economic systems and upholding similar values and principles, which 
make it easy to promote peace and stability. On the other hand, it also encourages states to 
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increase their administrative and institutional capacity to deal with the complicated 
integration issues.    
The EEC, with the big countries of the mainland Western Europe and “the major 
engines of European growth,”74 such as France, West Germany and Italy, part to it and with 
a combined population of 165 million75 in the 1960s, soon became an economic force in the 
world. All countries look for bigger markets for their products and they look for imports with 
fewer tariffs and associated costs to satisfy the domestic demand. The people of these 
countries in general and the traders, entrepreneurs, and business people look for a trade 
arrangement where one party does not take unilateral actions to boycott or stop the trade 
relationship or movement of goods, service, people and capital anytime without a 
consequence for their actions. The European integration process became appealing to those 
European countries which were otherwise reluctant and suspicious in the early stages of the 
initiative not least because it addresses these concerns.
The defection of five of the original members of the EFTA (Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Austria and Sweden) in favour of joining the European Community in 
different times reflects the ideals and values promoted by the EC is more attractive for states 
seeking long-lasting and deep integration with other societies and economies. Finland, which 
joined the EFTA in 1986 also followed the same route nine years later and joined the EC. The 
EFTA, though established as a direct economic rival to EEC and unlike the ECC “less 
demanding politically (as evidenced by the presence of the Portuguese dictatorship amongst 
its founder members),”76the founding members, and especially UK, were convinced the 
integration philosophy of the EEC is more appealing and could achieve success in the long-
term than their own. Another shortcoming of the EFTA was, unlike the EEC it did not have a 
common external customs tariff, which reflects members were reluctant to surrender some of 
                                                     
74 Lucia Coppolaro and Pedro Lains, “Portugal and the Quest for Europe, 1947-2007,” Instituto de Ciências 
Sociais, University of Lisbon (2009).
75 Jackson J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization, 10th ed., (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016), 884.
76 Charles Powell, “The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957-1986.”
52
their sovereignty to supranational authority for a common future and prosperity. As a result 
the EFTA is now remained with only two of the founding members (Switzerland and 
Norway) plus two late comers (Iceland -1970 and Liechtenstein - 1991). 
Currently the EEC (now the European Union – EU) has 28 countries as members with 
511.8 million population77, a single market with common currency, a Common Agricultural 
Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and many other common policies. With 
currency/monetary union achieved, the west European integration process has now reached 
deep economic integration. However, many Euro-enthusiasts are arguing that the current 
level of integration is not enough and the journey should be for more political union. Their 
concern is that the common currency level of integration can only be saved by pursuing 
common budgetary and fiscal policies. Leaders and politicians of the big founding members 
of the EEC – Germany, France and Italy – are among the ardent supporters of having 
common decision making on how to spend the common currency. The call for political union 
has gained strength especially after the 2008 financial crisis that hit some of the Eurozone 
countries. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in an interview with German television in 
2012, said “We need more Europe, we need not only a monetary union, but we also need a 
so-called fiscal union, in other words more joint budget policy. And we need most of all a 
political union – that means we need to gradually give competencies to Europe and give 
Europe control.”78Three years later, the Italian Economy and Finances Minister Pier Carlo 
Padoan, in an interview with Financial Times made exactly the same calls. “To have a full-
fledged economic and monetary union, you need a fiscal union and you need a fiscal policy. 
And this fiscal policy must respond to a parliament, and this parliament must be elected. 
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Otherwise there is no accountability.”79 What the future holds for the European Union 
integration adventure is to be seen with great interest. However, the journey it has covered so 
far is nothing short of success and a model for other regions’ endeavour of similar task. The 
early stages of integration, such as the free trade agreement, customs union, common market 
and monetary union have all successfully behind it. The last hurdle for EU is the last stage of 
the integration process, which is the fiscal and political union.  
As a success story so far, many lessons can be drawn from the experience of the west 
European integration process. Firstly, the initial stages of the integration should be dealt with 
functional approach, where the cooperation is very much focused on specific areas. At the 
early stages, states are suspicious and reluctant for their sovereignty to be encroached by 
other supranational authority. Therefore, they are not willing to surrender their sovereign 
rights to be managed by such body. However, functional arrangements, while respecting the 
sovereignty of each state and keeping it independent, it helps to overcome such mutual 
mistrust, suspicions and build confidence among states about the real intentions of their 
counterparts. Right after the end of WWII, when the task of reconstruction, bringing peace 
and stability and building trust between the arch-enemies who were fighting against each 
other a while ago became the overarching purpose of Europe, David Mitrany was one of the 
notable scholars who called for functional approach to the early cooperation initiatives taking 
place in Europe. In the post-conflict early years, when the warring European countries lack 
trusts to each other, he was of the opinion that functional approach serves better for 
cooperation, because “it is not a matter of surrendering sovereignty, but merely of pooling so 
much of it as may be needed for the joint performance of the particular task.”80Hence, the 
ECSC and Euratom cooperation of the 1950s of Europe were typical examples of functional 
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approach to early integration initiatives. Such kinds of arrangements can be appealing to
many governments, especially non-democratic regimes, as it allows them to take part without 
yielding some of the sovereignty of their powers. In addition, both democracies and non-
democracies can cooperate operationally in specific areas, the case of Portugal under the 
Salazar authoritarian regime being part of the EFTA is one example. The downside of the 
functional cooperation, however, is that it lacks credibility of commitment. The states 
involved can leave the cooperation anytime, or can fail to fulfil their duties without a price to
pay for their actions and behaviours.  
Secondly, Democratic conditionality is a driving/decisive factor for the success of 
regional integration. Looking from the experiences of the different regional groupings around 
the world so far, and particularly of the EEC/EU, democratic governance and regional 
integration are in fact positively correlated - the more democratic the block is the more it 
progresses in the integration process. Likewise, the more the block demands democratization 
as a requirement for membership, the more states pressurized to do so. If democratic 
governance is a requirement for membership, it removes big hindrance for the block to 
function relatively smoothly through transparent negotiations to resolve differences without 
resorting to unilateral actions of states. If governments act irrationally and unilaterally 
without giving consideration to the interests of their own people and their international 
partners, there are big prices to pay: audience cost being one of them. One of the strengths of 
democratic governance is that it brings stability to the political programs countries initiate 
collectively. As the governments that come to power through elections represent the will of 
the majority, it is difficult for them to reverse a political process which seeks to enlarge the 
cooperation with other countries to create bigger markets and increase the wellbeing to the 
general populace. Such political systems rest the power with the people and other democratic 
institutions. The leaders do not have absolute power to exercise at will as they are constrained 
by constitutional limits. There is a well established and functioning political system which is 
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above and beyond the leaders and can withstand their constant change through votes. 
Therefore, the leaders cannot simply bring to an end a political or economic program which 
has popular support. Hence, what one government started the next government builds on it.
The original six members of ECSC and EEC have seen constant change of political leaders 
from 1950 to 2017 (40 Italian Prime Ministers, 19 Belgian Prime Ministers, 14 Dutch Prime 
Ministers, 10 French Presidents, 9 Luxembourger Prime Ministers and 8 German 
Chancellors), but all remain faithful to the integration process as far as pro-EEC or pro-EU
public opinion remains dominant. 
Thirdly, the people are always eager to join regional groupings if they enhance 
domestic democratic governance as witnessed by the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek citizens, 
the media and civil societies. Furthermore, states are also willing to giveaway part of their 
sovereign rights (first in economy then politically) to supranational authority as far as it
advances the wellbeing and prosperity of their citizens. 
4.3.MERCOSUR - The Southern Common Market
The MERCOSUR was established in 1991 in the aftermath of the end of the cold war
between four Latin American countries of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay
(Venezuela joined in 2012). The Treaty of Asunción, the accord that created the block calls 
for "The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries 
through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the 
movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures;" and "The establishment of a 
common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy in relation to third States 
or groups of States."81The treaty further calls for the member states to work together and 
coordinate their policies in such areas as industry, agriculture, services, transport and 
communications, foreign trade, customs, foreign exchange and capital, fiscal and monetary 
matters. As a free trade area and customs union, the MERCOSUR is the largest integration 
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initiative in the Latin American region. As a customs union, the MERCOSUR members have 
a common external tariff against the rest of the world, which means they have already 
surrendered part of their sovereignty to be administered by the supranational body. With a 
population of around 300 million and GDP of $3.5 trillion, the MERCOSUR region is the 
fifth largest economy in the world.82
The MERCOSUR is the second regional grouping which embraces democratic 
conditionality as a membership requirement though neither all its member states are the best 
of democracies nor does the block strictly follow the rule in acceding new members. The fact 
that, like the EU, countries which apply to join the bloc are not automatically accepted, but 
rather they have to go through a long negotiation process and there should be a consensus 
among the incumbent members for the admission of new member, it is believed that the 
MERCOSUR is playing its role in consolidating democratic governance in the region which 
was blighted by military dictatorships for several decades. The Ushuaia Protocol on 
Democratic Commitment, also known as the Democracy Clause, which was signed between 
the four original members in 1998, is the political bench mark to be met by states seeking 
membership in MERCOSUR. The Ushuaia Protocol recognizes the importance of democratic 
institutions and governance in expediting regional integration and warns undemocratic 
practices and behaviours in member states will cause suspension of membership from the 
bloc. The principles of the Ushuaia Protocol were applied in 2012 to suspend Paraguay's 
membership when the bloc deemed the impeachment and dismissal from office of President 
Fernando Lugo was undemocratic. The democracy clause (the Ushuaia Protocol) was again 
invoked by MERCOSUR in August 2017 to suspend Venezuela indefinitely after President 
Maduro failed to heed international calls, including MERCOSUR, not to push ahead the 
election of pro-government constituent assembly. The four member states of MERCOSUR 
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resolved that, "any rupture of the democratic order constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the 
continuity of the integration process."83 The suspension entails the affected state is denied of 
all its rights, obligations and privileges as State Party to MERCOSUR in accordance with the 
terms of the Ushuaia Protocol. Article 7 of the Ushuaia Protocol also points out such 
suspension only ceases when the full restoration of democratic order in the country is 
verified.
The Paraguay case of 2012 demonstrates that the MERCOSUR members have a rift 
along ideological lines, which in turn is slowing down the integration process of the region. 
Brazil, under consecutive socialist governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, was in 
favour of granting Hugo Chavez's Venezuela membership in the bloc, which applied to join 
MERCOSUR in 2006. On the contrary, a more liberal Paraguay was opposing the admission 
of socialist Venezuela to the group. Brazil pushed strongly to suspend Paraguay's 
membership after President Fernando Lugo was ousted from office by the Senate for alleged 
failure to handle deadly clashes between farmers and police. The suspension of Paraguay 
from the group opened the door for the entrance of Venezuela in 2012. 
When Brazilian socialist President Dilma Rousseff herself was impeached and removed 
from office in 2016 for misappropriation of state funds, her vice-President Michel Temer, 
who is a more liberal politician, took over the presidency until 2018. Venezuela, under 
socialist President Nicholas Maduro, who came to power through popular vote after Chavez's 
death in 2013, in opposition to the political developments in Brazil, decided to freeze its ties 
with Brazil and recalled its ambassador from the country. Similarly, the new Brazilian 
president Michel Temer took a tougher stance and sounded more critical of Maduro. 
Therefore, the political and ideological affiliations compromise the effectiveness of the 
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democratic conditionality in promoting a more symmetrical political system among the 
member states.    
Those political divisions among the member states of MERCOSUR coupled with the 
long standing trade disputes between the bloc’s largest and more powerful countries of Brazil 
and Argentina, negatively affected the progress of the regional integration project which aims 
to achieve a common market and monetary union similar to that of the EU. Though it has 
been over a quarter of a century since it came in to existence, many Latin American countries 
are so far reluctant to join it. Apart from the four founding members, it is Venezuela and 
Bolivia which have showed interest to become full members. Many of the remaining South 
American countries, such as Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico instead of seeking to join it, 
they have opted to create their own new bloc called the Pacific Alliance. Albeit article 20 of 
the Treaty of Asunción subtly forbids cross membership by saying "...applications made by 
countries members of the Latin American Integration Association who do not belong to 
subregional integration schemes or an extraregional association may be considered before the 
date specified,"84 Argentina was granted an official observer status in the Pacific Alliance in 
2016. MERCOSUR is still the major dominant economic force in the South American region. 
However, its shaky and loose approach to its democratic conditionality is becoming a thorn in 
the flesh of its grand vision of common market. 
The worrying sign in the rift between the MERCOSUR bloc is its decreasing volume of 
regional trade among its members. Compared to the around $800 billion global trade of the 
member states, the intra-regional trade is around $108 billion. Though trade within the bloc 
jumped from $4 billion in 1990 to $20 billion in 1997,85 that pace slowed down in the next 
twenty years. Since 2011, trade between Brazil and Argentina, the largest trade partners of 
the region, fell by 42%. Similarly, trade between Brazil and Venezuela decreased by 38% 
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4.4.ASEAN 
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the most devastating civil wars, military and authoritarian dictatorships, poverty and 
economic progress. 
The ASEAN is composed of 10 countries with different types of political systems 
ranging from democracies (Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia) to one party system
(Singapore and Malaysia), from constitutional monarchies (Thailand) to communists
(Vietnam and Laos) and from Sultanate (Brunei) to military regime (Myanmar).89 In 1967, 
the original five members were either authoritarian dictatorships or monarchies. Therefore, 
from the outset of ASEAN, democratic conditionality as a requirement for membership was 
not on the agenda of the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 or the latest ASEAN Charter of 2007 
despite the bloc's dream of making the region peaceful and stable. The amalgamation of 
states with asymmetrical domestic political systems, coupled with non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other members, open membership to all Southeast Asian states and 
unwillingness to surrender part of their sovereignty to a supranational body has been holding-
back this regional grouping for the last half a century. ASEAN as a bloc has not evolved 
politically, which in turn negatively affects the dream "To accelerate the economic growth, 
social progress and cultural development in the region."90The Cambodia-Thailand border 
dispute, the Malaysia-Philippines territorial dispute over the Sabah Islands, the Ambalat 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Pedro Branca Island dispute between Malaysia 
and Singapore, the Malaysia-Brunei territorial dispute of Limbang in Sarawak, the South 
China Sea territorial dispute which involves many ASEAN member states are still 
unresolved. These unsettled issues together with the existence of several undemocratic 
regimes in the region are always breeding political mutual mistrust of the ASEAN countries. 
For this reason, "ASEAN leaders have deliberately avoided creating a strong supranational 
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regional institution...[therefore], in the foreseeable future it is unlikely to adopt a common 
external trade regime, with completely free commerce among member states."91
Fifty years after its establishment, economically the ASEAN is still partially at the 
preferential trade agreement stage of integration where several agreements for tariff reduction 
in very specific and easy products are in the process of slow implementation. So far, ASEAN 
member states are competing with each other in "politically more sensitive areas, heavy 
industry and food crops"92 let alone cooperate and remove barriers fully as the free trade area 
requires. For instance, Malaysia’s protectionist measures on its auto industry are primarily 
targeting Thailand, which is not the only direct competitor in that sector but also the leading 
country in the region.93Hence, both the tariffs and non-tariff barriers are making the vision of 
shared economic prosperity of ASEAN member states a distant possibility. 
4.5.Organization of African Unity/African Union
Having the experiences of EEC/EU, MERCOSUR and ASEAN as a backdrop, it is
important to look in to African regional integration project and its relationship with the 
democratic governance. 
Following the establishment of the EEC in 1957, it was the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) which emerged next as a major regional bloc in May 1963, when thirty-two 
independent African States launched the continental body in the Ethiopian capital, Addis 
Ababa. The objectives of the OAU, inter alia, are to expedite the integration of Africa 
politically, economically and socially and to "promote democratic principles and institutions, 
popular participation and good governance."94However, it is not clear whether the leaders of 
the OAU member states were aware of the importance democratization plays in accelerating 
the economic integration process. What is clear is that democracy was not and still is not a 
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requirement for membership in the African bloc. As a matter of fact, from the thirty-two 
founding members of the OAU, there were only eight countries which had democratic 
governments in 1963. The number soon decreased to four in the second half of the 1960s, and 
to just one country in the early 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990's Africa 
was the land of dictators, leaders for life, military Colonels and authoritarian leaders. The 
large number of those types of governments earned the OAU the nicknames such as the 
dictators' club and toothless bulldog.
Composed of mostly undemocratic leaders who assumed power through military coups 
themselves, the OAU was always complacent to the unlawful change of governments. The 
principle of "non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another"95
remains to be a major handcuff both for individual members and the OAU/AU as a bloc to 
act during unlawful and unconstitutional change of governments. To add salt to injury, and 
after it was taught several lessons the hard way during the 40 years preceding its 
establishment, the AU with its own principle confined itself from such interventions by 
declaring "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity."96 In its long list of principles, the AU again calls for "respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance" 97 and 
"condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments."98 However, the 
leaders of the AU showed their aversion to democracy when they opposed the adoption a 
democracy charter in 2006 in a meeting in Banjul, The Gambia. The democracy charter, 
which was "supposed to strengthen the electoral process, end military coups and stop 
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constitutional changes to let leaders stay in office”,99would have put a strong pressure on 
those undemocratic and unpopular governments in Africa to seek changes in their political 
system. The charter would also have sent signals for those who want to take power through 
unlawful means and discourage them from taking that course of action. It was not new, but 
rather a continuation of the OAU/AU's 50 years of failure of boldly fighting for
democratization to empower the people. The post-colonial domestic political systems existing 
in most African countries empower the leaders not the people. The different Charters, Acts, 
Declarations and policy documents produced by OAU/AU and which serve as basis for its 
functions, either openly or subtly consolidates this post-colonial political systems of African 
countries. As witnessed from both theory and experiences of many other regional economic 
integration schemes, democratic governance is the foundation for sustainable cooperation and 
deep-integration projects.   
However, the problem in many parts of the world, including Africa, is that the presence 
of political parties, holding of elections and criticizing the government alone is considered a 
proof for democratic governance. These physical characteristics of democracy, as important 
as they are, and as witnessed many times in Africa, do not guarantee that the country operates 
democratically or they fall short of reflecting the interests of the governed. As a result of this 
procedural approach to democratic governance, many African countries found themselves 
stuck in a vicious circle of conflicts and prolonged dictatorships. Many tyrants in Africa used 
the procedural democracy as a guiding principle to sustain and consolidate their grip in power 
indefinitely and heralded the emergence of draconian governance, further caused civil wars 
and ethnic massacres. Unfortunately, OAU/AU has done nothing to change this trend of 
governance, but on the contrary it has been approving such elections as conducted in a free 
and fair manner. It is these kinds of political systems and leaders whose powers have less 
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control that are standing tall in the path of African dream of economic integration. 
Democratic governance requires more than the existence of political parties and holding off 
sham elections. True democratic governance is measured by its substance – separation of 
powers between the three bodies of government (executive, judiciary and legislative) which 
helps them to check and balance to each other; existence of strong and vibrant civil societies 
which represent different economic, social and political groups and that counter balance the 
powers of the government and ensure accountability and transparency, and popular 
participation in national issues; free and objective mass media. This substantive democratic 
governance is exactly what is meant the existence of a government that reflects the will of the 
governed – a government that represents, listens, and empowers the people guarantees good 
governance. This type of government reduces tensions among the population and makes 
conflicts highly unlikely as the people have legal and peaceful means to voice their concerns 
and grievances. However, achieving this type government can only evolve through a long and 
winding process, taking into account the local culture and history, in a long period of time. 
The evolution and experience of the western democracies is a vivid example of this 
argument. It took Western Europe 300 years to reach the democratic standard of today from 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England to the introduction of universal suffrage in 
Portugal, Switzerland and Spain in 1970, 1971 and 1977 respectively. Nonetheless, many 
scholars agree that Western Europe countries have still many problems with their democratic 
systems and criticize that the EU suffers from democratic deficit. Trying to impose 
democratic governance by external actors, without considering the local context and without 
the involvement of the general public, as witnessed in many countries after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and particularly since the early 2000s, the damage it inflicts on societies 
outweighs its advantages.
In line with its objectives to accelerate the integration of Africa, the OAU/AU had 
produced many excellent action plans, such as the Lagos Action Plan (1981) and The Abuja 
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Treaty (1994), to push forward the regional integration process. As an action plan and to 
expedite the process, the AU itself has recognized the various regional economic 
communities (RECs) which were in existence even before the Lagos Action Plan, like the 
ECOWAS (1975), SACU (1969), EAC (1967), SADCC (1980) and those emerged after the 
Lagos Plan, like ECCAS (1983), SADC (1992),COMESA (1993), CEMAC (1994), IGAD 
(1996)as the building blocks for the grand regional integration of Africa. Though 
disintegrated and uncoordinated, the attempts for regional integration in Africa goes back as 
early as 1910 with the creation of Southern African Customs Union (SACU). However the 
achievements are little success at best and failure at worst. European Economic Community's 
success of starting with few countries then enlarging to include more members might be 
considered as a model. However, both MERCOSUR and ASEAN also started with small 
numbers, but have not achieved as much success as the EEC/EU. As mentioned earlier, the 
secret of EU's success is its strong adherence to democratic conditionality. MERCOSUR has 
achieved better progress than ASEAN only because it employs the democratic conditionality 
better than the latter. 
Similar to ASEAN, Africa's past experience with colonization is dire, its cultural 
diversity is very vast, its civil wars and military coups are matchless, its territorial disputes 
are innumerable, its economic situation is abject and its wealth is immense. Like in ASEAN, 
in the African integration RECs or AU itself, there is strong "political opposition to sharing 
sovereignty" and the "Integration arrangements are not characterized by strong supranational 
bodies and virtually all integration institutions are intergovernmental."100 Therefore, the 
result is an integration project stuck in the initial preferential trade stage, where there is 
selective tariff reduction to particular products only. Even though, many of the RECs call for 
free movement of people, goods and capital, in reality there are countless tariff and non-tariff 
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barriers. In a nutshell, the integration process in Africa, both through the AU and RECs, is 
lagging behind every schedule. 
Table 4: Relationship between democratic regional blocs and their integration progress  
Organization Year 
established
No. of 
founding 
members
No. of democratic 
countries of the 
founding members
Current 
number of 
members
No. of 
democracies
Democracy as 
precondition for 
membership
Level of 
integration
EEC/EU 1957 6 6 28 28 Yes Economic Union
OAU/AU 1963 32 8 (4*) 54 9 No Partially PTA
ASEAN 1967 5 1 10 4 No Partially PTA
MERCOSUR 1991 4 4 5 4 Yes Customs Union
Diagram 1: Levels of Integration
Deep Integration
Shallow Integration
PT
A
FTA
CU
CM
MU
FU Fiscal Union - member states adopt common 
budgetary (fiscal) policies 
Common market - in addition to the customs 
union policies, member states allow free 
movement of factors of production (mainly 
labour and capital) within the group
Free trade area (FTA) - trade is liberalized 
(tariffs and non-tariff barriers removed) 
between member states, but each state imposes
its own tariff to non-members.
Preferential trade agreement - tariff reduction 
to member states
Monetary Union - the common market policies 
are strengthened with the adoption of common 
currency 
Customs union - free trade between member 
states and they impose common external tariff 
to non-members 
ASEAN and 
AU
MERCOSUR
EU
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4.6.Challenges of the African regional integration
As can be seen from the above diagram, over half a century after its establishment "To 
coordinate and intensify [African States'] cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for 
the peoples of Africa"101 as one of its core purposes, the dream still remains elusive. Africa's 
sluggish progress in its regional economic integration endeavour is down to its neglect of the 
political evolution of the building-blocks of the continent - the African countries. The 
reluctance to yield part of their sovereignty to supranational authority necessitated the 
establishments of intergovernmental types of sub-regional and regional blocs to accelerate the 
economic cooperation. Therefore, both the OAU Charter of 1963 and the AU Consultative 
Act of 2000 declared the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states 
by another member state. This principle kept all African governments, including the handful 
of democracies, silent in the face of the worst types of human rights abuses, military coup 
d'états, genocides and many other unlawful and undemocratic acts. The tolerance and 
appeasements to undemocratic regimes only encouraged the proliferation of such regimes. 
The intergovernmental nature and unwillingness to surrender some aspects of their 
sovereignty emasculated the popular participation of the African people (civil societies, mass 
media, the business people, entrepreneurs and many others) in the integration process. These 
initiatives are issues mostly known to and participated by the top political leadership, but less 
known to the people at the bottom. Therefore, the integration approach in Africa, particularly 
since the turn of the century and the birth of the AU, follows the institutional or top-down 
integration based on the EU model. Many of AU's organs are carbon-copies, barring the 
name Africa for Europe, of the EU's organs both in name and their functions. However, it is
essential to remember that the EU institutions have evolved through time as the need to have 
such institutions was aroused from the demands of the enlargement both in membership and 
mandates. The AU's were simply copied from the EU model without real demands to have 
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such institutions on the day to day activities. Hence, their creation in the current political and 
economic context of Africa becomes irrelevant. For example, the Pan-African Parliament and 
the African Court of Justice, both the replica of European Parliament and European Court of 
Justice respectively, are extraneous in the current state of the integration when 
intergovernmentalism and opposition to sovereignty sharing are the main characteristics of 
the African integration project. Furthermore, if the decision-making process on some sectors 
or issues is left in the hands of the individual member countries, rather than managed by a 
supranational body, the task of reaching a consensus and moving forward with the integration 
agenda becomes difficult.   
Given the loathe to sovereignty sharing and inclination to intergovernmental type of 
regional grouping, there is fertile ground for African RECs to cultivate a functional 
cooperation in many fields as the continent is endowed with natural resources, yet at the 
people remain in the quagmire of poverty. The experience of the EEC/EU taught us how 
functional approach to cooperation can lead to greater achievements. In the immediate 
aftermath of WWII, the six founding members of the EEC/EU were against the idea of 
surrendering part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority. That is why they started 
with functional approach to integration with the ECSC and EURATOM. However, their 
democratic political systems which are always transparent to both the domestic audience and 
the international partners coupled with the functional cooperation clearly send signals to their
partners in the cooperation about their intentions. Therefore, it planted confidence and mutual 
trust among the six nations. As we have seen then, the rest is history. African countries in 
general, and the organ tasked to lead and accelerate the African integration - the AU - can 
draw a lesson from this experience and encourage African counties to follow similar path. 
Instead of trying to imitate the institutions of the EU, is looking into how and why the EU 
model is successful that can guarantee similar achievements. There are plenty of sectors, such 
as energy, raw materials, communication and transportation, where African countries can 
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pool their resources and cooperate without jeopardizing their sovereignty. Eventually these 
kinds of cooperation can set Africa on the path of its dream of bringing prosperity to the 
people through joining the small and disintegrated markets.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Africa is the first continent in the world to flirt with the idea of integrating regional 
economic in order to ensure the welfare of its people. Forty seven years before the 
establishment of the ECSC, in 1910five countries of Southern Africa, i.e. South Africa, 
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia established the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), the first customs union in the world, with the sole objective of free trade among 
themselves and common external tariff. Through the agreement they signed on June 29, 1910, 
the five countries adopted free trade in goods manufactured within the SACU region, 
common external tariff (CET) to non-members of the Union, and the sharing of revenues 
collected in the whole SACU region.102Even though it was a colonial structure, it was 
renegotiated and modified in 1969 after the independence of many of its members. The 127 
years old SACU is still in existence and operating in a way that benefits all of its members, 
especially the four smaller countries of Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana. The 
revenues collected by the Union account for "government budgets [of] 32% in Botswana, 
over 70% in Lesotho, 39% in Namibia and 56% in Swaziland."103By adopting common 
external tariffs, free trade and sharing of revenues, the SACU member states have yielded 
some of their sovereignty to the supranational body which helped them to access a bigger 
market and attain better economic benefits and welfare to their people. 
The SACU experience is one of the few bright spots in the unsuccessful economic 
integration expedition in Africa. Except for Swaziland, which is a very tiny kingdom, and 
Lesotho, which experiences periodic hiccups to its shaky democratic governance, all the 
remaining three members of SACU (South Africa, Botswana and Namibia) are some of the 
well established democracies in Africa. Their functioning quasi-economic integration 
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undertaking can also be taken as inspiration by the AU. However, if the AU is ever to have a 
chance of achieving some success like the SACU, it needs strong rules, regulations and 
conditions to govern the states taking part in the process. Without strong regulatory 
framework there cannot be capable and strong states which can go all the way in the rough 
road of integration efforts. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, a 
Ghanaian, speaking during AU’S launching summit in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, told 
African leaders, "only a Union of strong States can be strong itself. And the States must 
derive their strength, not from military force, but from the support of their people, mediated 
through a civil society...States are strongest when they are based firmly on the rule of law, 
and on the free consent of the citizens."104 However, any curious observer can ask how the 
AU can undertake the task of helping the African states evolve into mature countries ready to 
handle the pressure of a complex and sensitive process of integration.  
What can be done? 
The answer to the above inquiry is taking the bull by the horn, that is to say the AU 
should reform itself first by taking bold steps. And the first step begins with reforming the 
Consultative Act of 2001. The Consultative Act, with its numerous limitations, is the main 
Achilles Hill of AU's regional economic integration projects. Looking into the main 
shortcomings of the Act and proposing some remedies might help in that regard. 
This paper argues that lack of democracy negatively affects deep and wide integration 
process. The Consultative Act, Article 3 (g), itself does raise the issue of "promoting 
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance." However, 
there is no clarification as to how it achieves that goal. This objective largely remains as
rhetoric rather than a value for which the Union fights daily to instill in its member states. It 
is neither an essential requirement for membership that aspirant members must satisfy before 
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their accession to the Union nor put as a commitment to be fulfilled by member states in a 
specific period of time. Furthermore, governments of member states which fail to uphold 
these values are not subject to any kind of punitive measures or sanctions from the Union. 
The failure of the Union, therefore, to force its member states to embrace such values puts it 
in a negative light at best and makes it unknown at worst to the ordinary Africans as it does 
not influence their governments to respect their democratic rights.
The AU points out that it upholds the principles of "respect for democratic principles, 
human rights, the rule of law and good governance" (Article 4(m)); and "condemnation and 
rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments" (Article 4(p)). Once more, just as in 
Article 3, in this article, especially Article 4(m), it does not give further answers to those who 
ask how it promotes democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance? What are the criteria countries have to fulfil? What are the consequences of 
failure to abide by these principles and values? Examples of violation of these values and 
principles are abundant in many parts of Africa as good governance is still considered an item 
exported from the west. With regard to the Article 4(p), the best mechanism to ensure the 
Union has responded to unconstitutional change of government in a member country is 
further detailed in Article 30, which says, "Governments which shall come to power through 
unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union." 
However, this article in particular lacks clarity again. In the first place, it seems it approves
the existence of those governments that came to power long ago unconstitutionally or even if 
they came constitutionally but suspended the constitution and remained in power indefinitely. 
Second, if unconstitutional governments are removed unconstitutionally by another group 
that seeks to restore constitutional rule, does it mean the Union will condemn and reject 
them? Third, what is the concrete outcome of banning governments that seize power 
unconstitutionally from the activities of the Union? As far as bold economic sanctions (not 
only from member countries but also in cooperation with other trading partners) are imposed, 
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suspending the country from AU's activities only does not make sense in promoting good 
governance. 
The AU, according to its Article 23 (1), seems more concerned about its budget as it 
clearly defines what measures the AU takes for members which fail to pay their contributions 
to AU’S budget. Any such country faces restriction on its rights arising from its status as a 
member to the Union. Through Article 23 (2), the AU also warns failure "to comply with the 
decisions and policies of the Union" can be punishable with many sanctions, including but 
not limited to "denial of transport and communications links with other Member States."105
However, in practice, all the undemocratic and unconstitutional regimes that continue to 
undermine AU's policies and decisions continue to enjoy warm welcome in the Union's 
Summit of Heads of States, let alone from their counterparts in other African countries, even 
from the leaders of the democratic countries. 
The AU's soft Consultative Act reflects the underlying fear that a strong act, law or 
regulation might ward off African countries from joining the AU or weaken it by 
discouraging the participation of African leaders or governments. The opposite is true. Even 
if only few members which satisfy the conditions for membership join the Union, like when 
European Coal and Steel Commission was starting in 1952, eventually its success and 
benefits to its member countries will appeal others to transform themselves politically and 
economically from within to meet the criteria for membership and join it. If the AU wants a 
strong union of Africa, it has to be strong from its foundation and pillars. Integration is a long 
process, as witnessed by its own experience or other regional organizations like EU, ASEAN, 
or MERCOSUR. Even the most successful regional organization so far, the EU, has not yet 
reached the final stage of its vision. But its strong and clear laws, regulations, values and 
principles required for membership have forced as well as encouraged countries to take 
reforms as a precondition for accession. The paper, of course, is not calling for disbanding 
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and new start of AU. Rather, it argues that the AU has to set goals for democratic reforms of 
its members and the countries should be given time to carry out these reforms and embrace 
shared values and principles democratic political systems. The democratization program 
should be a gradual process with clearly set timetable of implementation. Failure to comply 
with the policies and decisions of the Union then should result in severe political and 
economic sanctions. It is inevitable that these bold steps will face opposition and suspension 
of membership by the undemocratic and unconstitutional leaders. However, the ever growing 
number of democratic members of the Union in cooperation with the international 
community and partners, like EU and US, should make sure that home grown and locally 
owned democratic process is taking hold in Africa.
There are core issues that need to be addressed to accelerate the integration process in 
Africa. Through reasoning out from the rich historical and contemporary arguments of the 
democratic peace theory and drawing lessons from the practical experiences of some regional 
integration projects, I have identified the neglected democratic evolution of most of African 
countries remains the main bottleneck to the economic integration process in Africa. 
Democratization plays two important roles domestically and internationally. Domestically, it 
can accelerate the nation-building process. In ethnically diverse societies, the very delicate 
and sensitive nation-building process cannot be advanced by using force. Because, the whole 
process can fall in disarray easily and descend to political instability and conflict. However, a 
political system that treats all ethnic groups equally and which ensures political 
representation of each and every group can bring stability to the country. Countries with 
undemocratic political system achieve this stability, but only when there is one big and 
dominant ethnic group. If two or more competing ethnic groups with equal weight exist in 
one country, the possibility of political conflict is always high. In such a situation, democratic 
governance is the best choice out of all the remaining political systems to manage that 
political competition. There are three ideas that we can borrow from the field of economics to 
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argue why such political system is the best alternative to promote peace and stability in 
ethnically diverse society and expedite the nation-building process. First, democracy can be 
defined as a public good – it is non-rival and non-excludable. When robust democratic 
political system is established, it benefits the majority of the people in any country and,
unlike in the other political systems where political and economic exclusion of the majority 
of the society is common, no one can be excluded from it. Second, democracy is efficient – it 
allocates representation in government, national resources and rights relatively fairly across 
the society. Third, democracy is a normal good – the more income of people increases, the 
more they demand democratic governance to resolve political, economic and social disputes.
Any given society competes over political representation, natural resources and rights. 
Exclusion from political and economic opportunities and the unlawful violation of rights and 
insecure property rights directly result to political instability of a society. Hence, with all its 
deficiencies, from all available political systems the best system to manage this competition
is democratic governance. 
Internationally, democratic political symmetry is the single most important factor in 
establishing peaceful environment. Peaceful international system in turn can foster close 
cooperation and successful regional economic integration. Countries which share the same 
political values and principles always run their domestic affairs transparently under the 
watchful eye of their people. And as discussed in detail in the above, such political structures 
empower, represent, listen and ensure broad based popular participation in the political and 
economic decisions of their countries. Regional integration is one of those very complex and 
sensitive ventures which cannot be successful without people-centred policies. This is the key 
area where politicians, economists or other professionals who have been leading the quest of 
economic integration in Africa, Southeast Asia, Middle East or Former Soviet Union States 
either intentionally or unintentionally have failed to address so far. AU and ASEAN are 
composed of countries with different domestic political systems and ideologies. Some of 
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them are democracies, while some of them are not. Some of them follow the capitalist 
ideology and some of them follow the Marxist ideology, while others are hybrid of the two. 
Some of them are transparent and let the people decide for their future while others make 
decisions in a narrow room. Inherently, these two systems are incompatible, because there is 
mutual mistrust between them. Maintaining both political systems while aiming to 
accomplish economic integration is to make the goal even more elusive. Therefore, ending 
this kind of political asymmetry from the political landscape of Africa is AU's acid test on 
whether it is up to the task of integrating Africa economically or not. Promoting democratic 
governance in Africa, therefore, should be the central pillar of AU, sheerly because it will 
help AU achieve two goals simultaneously: create strong African states and a peaceful 
international environment which accelerates the cooperation of these states to advance their 
integration project less costly both in terms of time and resources.      
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